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Abstract 
In light of a rise in the number and recurrences of armed conflicts, the purpose of 
this thesis is to investigate the role of interim constitutions in balancing short-term 
peacemaking and long-term peacebuilding goals in war-to-peace transitions where 
a new constitution is to be written. Drawing on peacebuilding and constitution 
making literature, the study examines the effect of the duration of interim 
constitutions with regard to the amount and quality of deliberation and 
participation in the constitution making process as well as the strength of national 
identity – the latter linking to power-sharing. Applying a mixed-methods research 
design, a descriptive statistical analysis is conducted on a sample of 11 post-
conflict countries with interim constitutions, followed by an in-depth comparative 
case study analysis of two of them: Iraq and Rwanda. The results indicate that by 
interposing time between the conflict and the final constitution, interim 
constitutions can contribute to a constitution making environment more conducive 
to inclusiveness and consensus-seeking. Accordingly, more time can enhance the 
potential for interim constitutions to positively affect the impact of post-conflict 
constitution making on the prospects of sustainable peace. 
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1 Introduction 
 
2014 saw the highest number of reported armed conflicts since 1999 (40)1 as well 
as the highest number of battle-related deaths in a single year since 1989 
(Petterson & Wallensteen 2015: 536). Even if excluding the major contributor, 
Syria, from the equation, who was single-handedly responsible for more than half 
of all deaths, the number of fatalities was still the highest since the year 2000 
(ibid.: 539, 546). At the same time, most contemporary civil wars are new 
recurrences of old civil wars, restarted by the same sets of rebels (Walter 2015: 
1242-3). The need to find ways to end armed conflicts and establish the 
foundations of sustainable peace is, needless to say, of substantive and immediate 
importance. As Walter pinpoints, “the main challenge surrounding civil war is no 
longer how to prevent new wars from starting but how to permanently end the 
ones that have already broken out” (ibid.: 1243). 
A number of studies have looked into how armed conflicts end and how the 
way in which they end affects the likeliness of violence to recur (e.g. Kreutz 2010; 
Licklider 1995; Toft 2010a; Toft 2010b). Licklider and Toft, for example, both 
find that civil wars ended by negotiated settlement are more likely to recur than 
those ended by the military victory of one side2. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold 
War has seen a significant increase in the proportion of conflicts ending in a peace 
agreement3 and a concurrent sharp reduction in the number ended by military 
victory (Paris & Sisk 2009: 1; Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 172; Toft 2010a: 6-7). At 
the time of writing, the war in Syria has entered a negotiation phase in which the 
Syrian government and the main Syrian opposition group, the High Negotiations 
Committee (HNC), are engaged in peace talks led by the UN and conducted amid 
a cessation of hostilities, suggesting that a negotiated settlement to the five-year 
long civil war is a probable outcome. Bearing the empirical findings of Licklider 
and Toft in mind, the recent development in Syria and the increased post-Cold 
War peace agreement trend actualizes and substantiates the need to consider the 
role and potential of negotiated peace processes in not only ending violent conflict 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Following the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths per year for 
a conflict to be considered active. 
2 While one side’s military victory can hardly be seen as a deliberate peacemaking tool, a belligerent could be 
“allowed” or even supported to win if the alternative, e.g. continued fighting, is deemed more harmful. See Toft 
(2010b) for an elaboration of the “give war a chance” argument. 
3 While the increase in proportion is widely acknowledged, there is broad disagreement over the size of that 
proportion, ranging from 18 percent (Kreutz 2010: 246) over one-third (Harbom et al. 2006: 617) to 50 percent 
(Bell 2006: 373) for the period 1989/90-2005. Other studies covering other and longer periods of time similarly 
suggest a one-third proportion (see e.g. Högbladh 2011: 39; Licklider 1995: 681 [looking at civil wars ended by 
negotiation]). 
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but also preventing the resumption of violence in the longer term. This, 
ultimately, entails considering the relationship between peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. 
Constitution making has long played a role in transitions from war to peace. 
While historically – following the developments in civil war termination – 
constitutions were usually imposed by the victors of a conflict, today they are 
more often part of a negotiated settlement to conflict (Brandt 2005: 6). In the last 
half century, and notably since the end of the Cold War, a surge in constitution 
drafting4 has taken place, a large part of which has taken place in conflict-affected 
contexts (Hart 2003: 2; International IDEA 2011: 8; Widner 2005: 503). As such, 
the periods after post-colonial independence and the end of the Cold War, the 
latter characterized by global political instability and a rising amount of intrastate 
conflicts (see e.g. Figure 1 in Petterson & Wallensteen 2015: 539), experienced a 
boom in new constitutions (International IDEA 2011: 8; see also Figure 1 in ibid.: 
9; “New Constitutions” data visualization by Comparative Constitutions Project). 
Constitutions and constitution making processes are seen by many as central to 
state- and peacebuilding agendas and the prospects of achieving sustainable peace 
in post-conflict societies as they may offer warring parties the opportunity to 
negotiate and settle underlying disputes through non-violent means while 
establishing an institutional framework that can foster long-term stability, security 
and justice (Ghai 2004: 1; Ludsin 2011: 243; Samuels 2006; Widner 2005: 503; 
Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 8). A positive connection between constitutions and 
sustainable peace has found empirical support with Walter (2015: 1256-8), who 
finds that countries with a written constitution have about one-tenth the risk of 
returning to civil war compared to countries without a constitution5. Also in 
Geneva, the peace talks on the future of Syria are intended to focus, among other 
things, on a new constitution for the war-ridden country (Davison 2016). 
In some instances, constitution drafting has found use not only as a post-
conflict measure, but also as a way to end armed conflict. In such cases, forging a 
new design of the state and/or securing the rights of a warring minority group in a 
not easily amendable constitutional document may be prerequisites for the 
combatants to lay down their arms – or encouraged by international peacemakers 
in order to convince them to do so (Ludsin 2011: 242-4; “Workshop on 
Constitution Building Processes” 2007: 25). This may lead the peace process to 
involve constitution writing and the resultant constitution to function as a peace 
agreement (Ludsin 2011: 239). However understandable the reasons for conflating 
peacemaking and constitution drafting processes may be, it may not be equally 
desirable: Whereas peacemaking is first and foremost concerned with ending 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 The terms constitution making, constitution building, and constitution drafting will be used interchangeably, as 
they are in much of the literature. 
5 Walter argues that by increasing government accountability through legal checks and restraints, the presence 
and independent judicial enforcement of constitutions make government leaders more attractive and trustworthy 
negotiating partners for the rebels (2015: 1245). However, as Walter does not look at when, how and by whom 
constitutions are drafted, his results do not say much about constitution building as a deliberate peacebuilding 
tool. 
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violence, constitution drafting is aimed at founding a stable and functioning state 
by establishing a legal framework for governance (ibid.: 245-7). The nature and 
purpose of a peace agreement is different from that of a constitution as are the 
actors usually involved in making them. Drafting a constitution amid conflict may 
simply lead the immediacy of saving lives to move the longer-term constitutional 
goals down the priority list. This carries with it a number of risks all of which 
have potentially detrimental consequences for the subsequent peace, the stability 
of the state and, ultimately, the sustainability of peace (ibid.: 284-5; “Workshop 
on Constitution Building Processes” 2007: 25). 
Following from the tension between the peacemaking and peacebuilding 
potential of constitution drafting, emerging but still limited scholarly attention has 
been given to interim constitutions. Usually following the signing of a peace 
agreement, or de facto constituting one, the interim constitution is intended to 
simultaneously set out an immediate (but temporary) institutional framework for 
government, set the stage for negotiating a new governmental structure and 
outline the procedure – and often deadline – for drafting a final constitution 
(International IDEA 2014: 5; Ludsin 2011: 287). Because of their potential to 
both satisfy the constitutional demands necessary for creating peace, and at the 
same time enhance the permanent constitution’s chances of contributing to its 
maintenance by deferring the final drafting to more secure and stable times, the 
use of interim constitutions has been widely and explicitly preferred by scholars 
over permanent ones during ongoing violence (see e.g. Ludsin 2011: 310-11; 
Varol 2014: 463; Widner 2008: 1533-34; “Workshop on Constitution Building 
Processes” 2007: 26-7). 
A central aspect of an interim constitution is its duration, i.e. the period of 
time it interposes between peace agreement and final constitution. As a recent 
study on interim constitutions concludes, “[t]ime is an interim constitution’s 
single most important contribution to a constitution-building process in a conflict-
affected setting” (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 28). Nevertheless, interim constitutions 
in general and the role of time in particular has received only marginal scholarly 
attention as specific issues of study, leading Jackson (2008: 1278) to emphasize 
“the need for more analysis of the role of time, and timing, in constitution-making 
and regime change”. This thesis seeks to remedy these deficiencies by examining 
the following research question: 
1.1 Research question and purpose of study 
How does the duration of interim constitutions affect the peacebuilding potential 
of post-conflict constitution making? 
 
As reflected in the research question, the purpose of this study is to investigate the 
usefulness of interim constitutions for balancing short- and long-term 
considerations in war-to-peace transitions that involve constitution making. It will 
do so by analyzing the effect of interim constitutions’ duration on a number of 
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factors that are believed to have an impact on the prospects of building a stable 
and secure post-conflict society. The factors under study are deliberation, 
participation and power-sharing (further explained below). Three hypotheses 
relating to these factors will be deduced and their validity explored in a mixed-
methods analysis, beginning with a statistical analysis of 11 post-conflict 
countries with interim constitutions since 1990 and followed by in-depth case 
studies of two of them. 
Due to its centrality to the study, the notion of ‘peacebuilding potential’ needs 
clarification. ‘Peacebuilding’ in this context is understood as the process towards 
creating a self-sustaining peace and, ultimately, preventing a resumption of civil 
war, once a negative peace has been established (further elaborated below). As 
this study does not aspire to evaluate and assess the implementation and success 
of these processes, the term ‘potential’ reflects the expected (based on the 
literature) rather than actual contribution to the peacebuilding goals of founding a 
sustainable peace. In Section 5.3, the distinction between potential and actual is 
briefly touched upon regarding the cases under in-depth study. 
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2 Previous research and theoretical 
argument 
2.1 Previous research 
By focusing on interim constitutions, this study both speaks to and is informed by 
different strands of scholarly research. Interim constitutions find themselves in the 
nexus between war and peace; between peacemaking and peacebuilding; and 
between peace agreement and permanent constitution, which demands an 
interdisciplinary approach to their examination. This study will therefore tap into 
the fields of peace and conflict studies and rule of law and, within these, engage 
with conflict resolution, peacebuilding and constitution making theory and 
practice. As called for in the discussion report from an academic workshop on 
interim constitutions in post-conflict settings in December 2014, ”[t]here is a clear 
need to establish linkages between the normative literatures on constitution 
making on the one hand, and conflict resolution and peacebuilding on the other” 
(International IDEA 2014: 3). This thesis attempts to make a contribution to this. 
Below some central points within and between these disciplines in relation to the 
focus of the thesis will be briefly discussed. 
2.1.1 Peacemaking and peacebuilding 
The marked increase of armed conflicts ending in a peace agreement since the end 
of the Cold War has been followed by a growing scholarly literature on peace 
agreements (Bell 2006: 373-4). Given their questionable track record6, much of 
this literature has looked at the design and substance, i.e. the different elements, of 
peace agreements with a view to assess how it affects their success or failure (e.g. 
Rothchild 2002). Less focus has been paid to their binding nature and legality – or 
lack thereof – and its importance for compliance (Bell 2006: 374-5). A number of 
recent studies though have looked at legality in negotiated settlements, merging 
the legal and conflict resolution spheres in hybrid conceptualizations such as 
“peace agreement constitutions” and “constitutional peace agreements” (Bell 
2006; Easterday 2014). The concepts underscore both the centrality of (interim) 
constitutions in war-to-peace transitions and the fluidity between them and peace 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 According to research, nearly 50% of peace agreements break down within five years and more so within ten 
years (Bell 2006: 375). 
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agreements7. According to these scholars, such legalized agreements may – both 
as providers of a framework for governance and as sources of norms and (also 
legal) interpretation that promote peaceful interaction and conflict resolution – 
enhance the continuous commitment of warring parties and the population to 
compromises made to stop violent conflict (Bell 2006: 407-8; Easterday 2014: 
386-7). As such, they can be seen as attempts at bridging the gap between short-
term/negative peace and long-term/positive peace goals of the peace process – 
that is, between peacemaking and peacebuilding (Bell 2006: 408). 
 
 “The timeliness of analyzing the role of interim constitutions or constitutional 
provisions as peacebuilding mechanisms is self-evident, given the increasing use 
of constitution building in peacebuilding processes” (International IDEA 2014: 3) 
 
While peacemaking is concerned with ending direct violence, peacebuilding is 
“the project of overcoming structural and cultural violence” (Ramsbotham et al. 
2011: 199). The hope is that peacebuilding can “consolidate peace in the short 
term; and, in the long term, increase the likelihood that future conflicts are 
resolved without violence” (Ludsin 2011: 242). Central to this end is the process 
of statebuilding, which encompasses efforts to build, or strengthen, effective and 
legitimate governmental institutions as a way to (expectedly) foster security and 
stability (ibid.: 243; Paris & Sisk 2007: 8; Paris & Sisk 2009: 1-2). A recent but 
central reference point within statebuilding literature and practice is “Fixing 
Failed States” by Ghani & Lockhart (2008), in which the authors outline a 
framework for rebuilding states consisting of ten key functions a state should 
perform and at which statebuilding exercises should be aimed. The ability, among 
other things, to set out such (democratic) institutional framework, has led several 
scholars to argue for the relevance of constitutions in state- and peacebuilding (see 
Introduction). 
Other scholars have argued that peacebuilding must entail a focus not only on 
(re)building state functions but also on the strength of the political community, 
involving elements of culture and identity, in order to assign legitimacy to the new 
state institutions (e.g. Brown et al. 2010). In line with this thinking, studies have 
looked at constitution making’s peacebuilding potential through its contribution to 
nationbuilding processes in divided societies. These studies argue that by 
directing and formalizing the formation of a collective, national identity, 
“constitutional nationbuilding” may provide such legitimacy for the statebuilding 
project (von Bogdandy et al. 2005). Whichever approach to peacebuilding is 
taken, the overall aim is to prevent a recurrence of civil war. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 The close connection between interim constitutions and peace agreements is not only theoretical: In 15 out of 
18 cases of post-Cold War interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings studied by International IDEA, the 
interim constitution was either preceded, succeeded or constituted by a peace agreement (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 
13). 
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2.1.2 Constitution making 
In the literature on constitution making, recent attempts have been made at trying 
to better understand and optimize the role of constitution making in conflict-
affected settings from both a theoretical and practical perspective. This new strand 
of research is borne out of the surge in new constitutions, especially post-conflict 
ones, following the end of the Cold War and diverges from previous constitutional 
theory, which has mainly been concerned with constitutions in stable political 
contexts.  
The theoretical foundation is a new conceptualization of the nature and role of 
constitutions in times of radical political change developed by legal scholar Ruti 
Teitel, namely that of transitional constitutions. Against the realist view, 
according to which constitutions reflect the balance of power at the time of 
political change and therefore do not play any certain role as agents of change, 
Teitel builds her theory upon an idealist perspective that recognizes their potential 
to constitute a break with an old system and a foundation of a new political order 
(Teitel 1997: 2052-6). While the constitution in this view is seen as the 
culmination of the transition, Teitel views transitional constitution making as less 
of a clean break and more of a gradual, transformative process “in fits and starts” 
(ibid.: 2057). The transitional constitution is often not a permanent, enduring 
structure but instead intended as an interim measure with partly provisional 
features and continually subject to development (ibid.). Teitel thus departs from 
idealist thinking, theorizing that “[t]ransitional constitutions are not simply 
revolution-stoppers, but they also play a role in constructing the transition” (ibid.: 
2059). They permit rather than complete the revolution (Ludsin 2011: 248). 
Building on Teitel’s ideas, Vivien Hart proposes a more process-focused and 
participatory new constitutionalism as a way of bridging the tensions between the 
stability and permanence traditionally associated with constitutions and the 
flexibility necessary to mediate conflict and divisions (Hart 2001; Hart 2003). 
Interim constitutions are widely regarded as a central aspect of this new paradigm 
of constitution making and “one possible way of resolving the tension between 
fluidity and order, and contributing to sustainable peace” (International IDEA 
2014: 3; see also Arato 2007; Hart 2003) 
From a more practical perspective, scholars have looked at the design of post-
conflict constitutions in terms of both their substance and the process of their 
drafting with a view to explore and enhance their potential for contributing to a 
successful outcome (e.g. Ghai & Galli 2006; Horowitz 2008; Lijphart 2004; 
Miller 2010; Samuels 2006; Samuels & Wyeth 2006; Widner 2008). Lerner 
(2010), for instance, proposes an incrementalist approach to constitution making 
in deeply divided societies in which constitution drafting is limited to institutional 
matters, while decisions over foundational and potentially divisive aspects of the 
polity, e.g. questions of national identity or state-religion relationship, are 
postponed and exported to those political institutions. Other more process-
oriented studies have focused on the degree and nature of international 
involvement in constitution drafting (e.g. Brandt 2005; International IDEA 2011); 
and another, large body of literature on the type and extent of public participation 
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in the process (e.g. Ghai 2004; Hart 2001; Hart 2003; Samuels 2005; Widner 
2005). Because of its relevance for this thesis, the latter is briefly discussed below. 
Based on the view that how constitutions are made is as important as their 
content, a number of scholars, led by Vivien Hart and Kirsti Samuels, have 
highlighted the significance of inclusiveness in constitution making for the 
prospects of creating a sustainable peace. This has, at least, two explanations: 
First, involving the public in the process, the argument goes, is necessary for 
legitimizing the new constitutional order “based on the belief that without the 
general sense of ‘ownership’ that comes from sharing authorship, today’s public 
will not understand, respect, support, and live within the constraints of 
constitutional government” (Hart 2003: 4). Second, constitution making is seen as 
a “forum for negotiation” and “open-ended conversation” over contested issues 
and may as such “lead to the democratic education of the population, begin a 
process of healing and reconciliation through societal dialogue, and forge a new 
consensus vision of the future of the state” (Samuels 2006: 667). While an 
apparent trend of public involvement exists in practice (Ginsburg et al. 2009: 219; 
Miller 2010: 647), Hart even speaks of an emerging legal right to participate in 
constitution making (2003; 2010). 
While some theoretical critiques have been raised (see Moehler 2008: 33-4 for 
a brief review), a number of empirical studies have investigated the theoretical 
assumptions about the effects of participation on constitutional outcomes. From a 
case study of Uganda, Moehler (2008) finds that participation did not determine 
citizens’ support for the constitution – it was rather affected by elite opinion. 
While his study suggests that the potential of participation to increase 
constitutional legitimacy may be conditioned by elite sentiments toward the 
process and outcome (cf. the first explanation above), Moehler at the same time 
finds that public involvement in constitution making can “make citizens more 
democratic, knowledgeable, discerning and engaged”, thus positively affecting 
political culture (cf. the second explanation) (ibid.: 203). In a large-N study 
examining the effects of participation on constitutional content, Ginsburg et al. 
find an apparent association between public involvement and the presence of 
rights and democratic institutions in the final constitution (2009: 219). 
2.1.3 Interim constitutions 
“The literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding has mostly not 
elaborated on the specific role of interim constitutions as part of the greater 
constitution building process” 
(International IDEA & the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law 2014: 5) 
 
A monumental and important work in the nexus between peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and constitution drafting has been done by Hallie Ludsin (2011). In 
her text, Ludsin presents a number of practical tensions deriving from the use of 
constitution drafting as a peacemaking tool. Ludsin sees the tensions as inherent 
to the merging of the two processes, caused by their diverging goals rather than as 
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a result of a specific constitutional design. While questioning and challenging the 
assumption of compatibility of these processes, she acknowledges that “the nature 
of many conflicts (and the parties to them) often demand some type of 
constitutional change to secure peace, making it impossible to simply abandon 
this peacemaking tool” (ibid: 286). To overcome this, she proposes an interim 
constitutional process with multiple stages involving 1) establishing the procedure 
for drafting an interim constitution; 2) adopting the interim constitution; and 3) 
drafting a permanent constitution (ibid.: 287-291). In her view, notwithstanding 
the risk of being undermined by context-specific conflict-circumstances, such 
interim process offers the potential to alleviate the merger tensions and thus holds 
a better opportunity for achieving sustainable peace than a permanent constitution 
drafted during ongoing violence (ibid.: 310-311). 
While the theoretical basis of interim constitutions is slowly emerging, 
empirical studies of the topic are largely absent. As exceptions to the rule, two 
recent studies by International IDEA (2014; Zulueta-Fülscher 2015) have 
developed the conceptual framework as well as empirical, comparative knowledge 
basis of interim constitutions. The latter study detects 30 cases of post-Cold War 
interim constitutions adopted worldwide of which 20 were in conflict-affected 
settings (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 13). One of the conclusions the study draws from 
the analysis showing that 14 countries either relapsed into or never stopped being 
in conflict is that interim constitutions offer no guarantee of success if the success 
criteria is simply to end violence (ibid.: 15-16). Highlighting the difference 
between peace agreements and interim constitutions in terms of legality, the study 
furthermore provides a definition of an interim constitution as “a constituent 
instrument that asserts its legal supremacy for a certain period of time pending the 
enactment of a contemplated final constitution” (ibid.: 9). 
2.1.4 Power-sharing 
Power-sharing is found both in the conflict resolution, peacebuilding, democratic 
theory and constitution making literature. This is understandable: It is usually 
applied in the immediate context of (ending) armed conflict, often enshrined in 
constitutional form and with potential long-term effects on the post-conflict 
society. The concept is comprehensive and comprises a range of different sub-
categories and -dichotomies. One concerns approaches to power-sharing: Whereas 
consociational power-sharing aims to make society’s different (ethnic, sectarian, 
religious) sub-groups govern together by some form of consensus, the 
integrative/centripetal model aims to transcend group differences and encourage 
multi- or cross-ethnic coalitions and political agendas (Horowitz 2008; Samuels & 
Wyeth 2006: 1; Sisk 2013: 10). Another distinction concerns the level at which 
power-sharing takes place: The horizontal/political dimension involves power-
sharing and political representation in the main branches of government, while 
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vertical/territorial power-sharing refers to federalism and decentralization, e.g. 
granting regional autonomy (Norris 2008; Samuels & Wyeth 2006: 5-7)8. 
Although theoretically dichotomized, these latter categories are not mutually 
exclusive, and elements of both may, and do, co-exist, as is the case in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
While some form of power-sharing is broadly recognized as a useful and often 
necessary short-term tool for making combatants lay down their arms9 – in 
particular in identity-based conflicts – there is more scholarly disagreement as to 
its effects over time for the prospects of sustaining the peace. Advocates argue, 
based on the consociational model, that securing major societal groups and former 
warring parties a stake in inclusive, democratic processes encourage cooperative 
behavior, which may moderate ethnic tensions and stabilize fragile democracies 
(Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008). Against this argument, a large, critical strand of 
literature claims that the rigidity and formalization of divisions of power along 
ethnic or identity lines resulting from power-sharing structures creates an 
institutional ‘path dependency’ and prevents the fostering of reconciliation and a 
broader national identity (Jarstad 2008; Rothchild 2002; Samuels 2009; Samuels 
& Wyeth 2006; Sisk 2013; Sisk & Stefes 2005). Instead, it risks “both entrenching 
and radicalizing underlying divisions” (Samuels 2009: 183). These arguments 
have found empirical backing: A study by the International Peace Academy (IPA) 
examining the impacts of constitutional choices in six post-conflict countries finds 
that formal executive power-sharing structures (as opposed to territorial power-
sharing) along ethnic or other identity lines appear to entrench rather than 
ameliorate the divisions that fueled the conflict, leading to a fragile peace where 
the parties are not reconciled and the underlying tensions not addressed (ibid.: 6). 
On the contrary, those “divisions appear to become radicalized during the power-
sharing phase” (ibid.). Other empirical studies have similarly shown that territorial 
autonomy or decentralization may increase the likeliness of civil war recurrence 
by reinforcing disintegrative tendencies in the state-subunit relationship 
(Pospieszna & Schneider 2013; Roeder 2012 (as reported in Sisk 2013))10.  
Without rejecting power-sharing altogether due to its usefulness for ending 
civil war, the critics argue that “[f]or statebuilding over time, initial power-sharing 
institutions need to be gradually reformed to introduce ongoing incentives for 
more fluid bargaining and coalition-making that cross-cuts the lines along which 
war was fought” (Sisk 2013: 15). The present study takes its point of departure in 
this critical position. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 As Pospieszna & Schneider (2013: 48) note, the former is more likely used after conflicts over government, the 
latter over territory. Supplementing this most often-applied dualism, recent empirical studies have also 
distinguished and examined military and economic forms of power-sharing (Jarstad & Nilsson 2008; Ottmann & 
Vüllers 2015). 
9 According to one study, “warring parties are 38 percent more likely to sign an agreement if it includes 
guaranteed positions in the future government” (Jarstad 2008: 109). 
10 The opposite case, however, has also been argued (see e.g. Jarstad & Nilsson 2008; Samuels & Wyeth 2006), 
and the effects of territorial power-sharing on sustainable peace are generally more disputed than is the case for 
political power-sharing, where the ‘negative effect’ view is predominant. 
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2.2 Theoretical argument and hypotheses 
The study will seek to answer the research question by examining if and how 
variance on the duration variable affects a number of factors that are claimed to 
affect the peacebuilding potential of post-conflict constitution making. The factors 
are deliberation, participation and power-sharing. They are chosen on the 
grounds that they, according to the literature, are influenced by time and influence 
the potential for peacebuilding. These factors and their connection with time is 
described below. 
As a point of departure, interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings are 
intended to have an effect on the level of violence in the area affected by conflict. 
An often-cited measure of success for interim constitutions, as for constitutions in 
general, is ending violence (see e.g. Ludsin 2011: 287; Widner 2008: 1515; 
“Workshop on Constitution Building Processes” 2007: 7; Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 
15-6). As noted above, interim constitutions are closely connected to peace 
agreements: they sometimes precede them; they most often succeed them; and 
sometimes peace agreements constitute de facto interim constitutions (Zulueta-
Fülscher 2015: 13-4). Interim constitutions, together with the peace agreement, 
may therefore be expected to halt or at least scale down violent conflict (ibid.: 3) – 
particularly in cases where constitutional change is demanded by warring parties 
and therefore necessary for them to lay down their arms. The extent to which this 
happens determines its success as a peacemaking tool. Since the halt or decrease 
in violence is expected to take effect when the interim constitution is adopted, the 
duration of the interim period may not in itself have an effect on the level of 
violence. However, the extent to which the level of violence decreases throughout 
the interim period is decisive for the interim constitution’s ability to provide some 
measure of security for the drafting of the final constitution to take place in. This 
is one of the key reasons for using interim constitutions and a key contribution to 
the peacebuilding potential of the broader constitution making process. As Ludsin 
formulates it, “[a] multi-stage [interim constitutional] process can succeed only if 
security is achieved prior to the drafting of a final constitution” (2011: 310). The 
centrality of the relation between interim constitution and level of violence is 
apparent in its influence on the other factors studied here and will therefore be 
part of their examination. 
First therefore, one consequence of a longer interim period is that it allows for 
more time to deliberate and negotiate the final constitution. The potential benefits 
of more deliberation are seen in its contrast: A short, pre-fixed timeframe or 
pressure caused by on-going violence to simply reach an agreement, even if 
imperfect, may provoke a speedy drafting process leaving less time for the 
drafters to “thoughtfully” and “carefully” design the new constitution and its 
institutional framework as well as to consider the impacts of their decisions in the 
long term (Easterday 2014: 402-3; Horowitz 2008: 1227; Ludsin 2011: 269; 
Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 28). Without proper time to reflect on the meaning of each 
constitutional provision, the final drafting becomes more likely to result in 
unintended consequences for the post-conflict state (Ludsin 2011: 292). Because 
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it also risks inappropriately limiting the substance of the constitution – in terms of 
both the provisions that enter the final document and those that do not – a hurried 
process may reduce the ability of the final constitution to suit both current and 
future needs of the population (ibid.: 269-70). On the contrary, “[l]onger time-
frames between the peace agreement negotiation and constitution drafting can 
allow for more deliberation and inclusion and can increase the likelihood that the 
constitution will succeed” (Easterday 2014: 403; see also Brandt 2005: 29). This 
leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The longer the interim period, the more deliberation over the final 
constitution. 
 
However logical and potentially significant the relationship between time and 
deliberation may be, it will not be explored in the statistical analysis because of 
the difficulty of operationalizing and measuring the deliberation factor 
quantitatively. It will be explored in the case study analyses instead. 
Second, another benefit of interim constitutions is that they may increase the 
likelihood of an inclusive and participatory final drafting process. They may do 
so, first of all, indirectly by affecting the level of security, as described above. 
Ongoing violence may limit the participation of both negotiators and the broader 
population in the drafting because of e.g. fear for one’s safety, a likely result of 
intimidation, or the impossibility of arriving at the negotiations (Ludsin 2011: 
254-5). Thus, an interim constitution that significantly lowers the level of violence 
likely increases the prospects of a participatory process. In addition to this, more 
inclusive and representative drafting procedures simply take more time to be 
conducted. More concretely, the most time-consuming elements of a constitution 
making process are elections for and the administrative and procedural 
establishment of a constituent assembly; public education and consultation, 
including the opportunity for drafters to take the public input into account; and the 
holding of a ratification referendum (Miller 2010: 640); all elements of a 
representative and participatory process. In a more direct sense, therefore, longer 
interim periods that allow more time for drafting are likely to increase the degree 
of participatoriness in the constitution making process by allowing for lengthy 
participation components (Ludsin 2011: 292-3). As shown above, this may 
increase the legitimacy of the constitution and lead to democratic education and a 
process of reconciliation in the population with positive consequences for the 
prospects of building a stable and secure society. On hypothesis form: 
 
H2: The longer the interim period, the more participatory the drafting process 
of the final constitution. 
 
Third and finally, as mentioned above one central benefit of the interim period 
is that it can ‘remove’ the final drafting process from the proximity of armed 
conflict. In societies coming out of conflict over ethnic identity issues, for 
instance, “people might be unlikely to be able to think in non-ethnic or even 
cross-ethnic terms when only recently ethnicity might have been a matter of life 
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and death” (ibid.: 264). The factors that helped create and drive the conflict are 
likely to remain in people’s minds, even after violence has ended, leaving society 
divided and with a poor base for national unity. The passage of time, however, 
may allow the immediate conflict dynamics, enmities and polarizations to ease 
and some level of trust to be built among the warring groups (ibid.: 309-10; 
Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 21). By giving time before the final drafting, interim 
constitutions therefore “have the potential to facilitate consensus over time on 
issues that directly or indirectly caused the conflict to erupt in the first place” 
(ibid.: 27). This may in turn provide the basis on which a new national identity 
can be forged. A short interim period makes it difficult to establish that consensus 
on national identity since trust does not have sufficient time to grow (Ludsin 
2011: 268-9, 291-2). Of course, this is not to expect such consensus to be reached 
at all during the interim period – after all, unifying a divided population behind a 
common national identity is a focus of long-term nationbuilding and 
reconciliation processes. Nevertheless, higher levels of trust and a less polarized 
environment than during or immediately after violent conflict should increase the 
chances of a stronger consensus on national identity. 
The risk of drafting the final constitution on the basis of a weak national 
identity is that it may end up institutionalizing the societal divisions in formal 
power-sharing arrangements (ibid.: 264; Samuels & Wyeth 2006: 5-6). Power-
sharing has been a common tool for conflict resolution in peace negotiations since 
“a power-sharing model is often the only option that will bring the parties to the 
table and stop the violence” (ibid.: 5). However, as effective it may be as a 
peacemaking tool, as ineffective or potentially detrimental power-sharing may be 
for the peacebuilding agenda and the aim of fostering sustainable peace (see 
Section 2.1.4). These considerations should lead us to expect that a longer 
duration of the interim constitution would reduce the likeliness, and necessity, of 
the final constitution to contain power-sharing provisions by providing a stronger 
basis for consensus on national identity and unity. Therefore:  
 
H3: The longer the interim period, the less likely the presence of power-
sharing provisions in the final constitution. 
 
Power-sharing functions as an implication of the intervening variable, national 
identity. The latter and its relationship with power-sharing will be examined in the 
case studies. The relationship between the duration of the interim constitution, the 
factors mentioned above and the peacebuilding potential of constitution making is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical argument 
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3 Research design and methodology 
3.1 Mixed-methods research design 
This study relies on the use of mixed methods. The advantage of combining 
quantitative and qualitative analysis is intuitively evident: The ability of the 
former to, inter alia, detect generalizable patterns of a hypothesized correlation 
over a large number of units is complemented by the latter’s utility for examining 
the plausibility and direction of causal mechanisms in that relation. Such 
complementarity, whereby the weaknesses of each method is counter-balanced 
with the strengths of the other, may increase overall confidence in a study’s 
findings (Lieberman 2005: 436). For this reason, first, a limited, descriptive 
statistical analysis is carried out aimed at examining the correlation (if any) 
between the duration of the interim period and the factors participation and 
power-sharing. Second, for the triple purpose of (1) analyzing factors that are 
difficult to quantify (in this case, the quality of deliberation), (2) understanding 
the mechanisms at work in the hypotheses and (3) examining the likelihood of any 
causality (i.e. the ways and extent to which time may or may not influence the 
factors, including the explanatory power of the proposed intervening variable, 
national identity, for power-sharing) a comparative case study is conducted. 
3.2 Delimitations 
The sample of cases examined in the thesis is based on International IDEA’s 
recent study on interim constitutions (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015) and consists of 11 
conflict-affected countries since 1990 that have had an interim constitution that 
eventually resulted in a final constitution11. The selection has been correlated with 
data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2014). The 11-case 
sample is derived from a universe of 30 interim constitutions adopted since 1990 
(see Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 10). Here, the first delimitation has been made of 
excluding interim constitutions adopted prior to 1990 from the analysis. This is 
partly due to the fact that the use of interim constitutions has increased 
significantly since 1990, and partly that most interim constitutions in the 1945-
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 These are Ethiopia (1991-1995), Togo (1991-1992), Eritrea (1992-1997), Chad (1993-1996), Rwanda (1994-
2003), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1994-1997 and 2003-2006), Burundi (1998-2001 and 2001-
2004), Afghanistan (2001-2004), Kosovo (2001-2008), Iraq (2004-2005) and Nepal (2007-2015). 
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1990 period were deployed after coups (International IDEA 2014: 5) and not as 
part of a negotiated settlement to civil war, which is the primary focus of this 
thesis. 
Of the 30-case universe of post-Cold War interim constitutions, the following 
delimitations have been made: First, the interim constitutions that have not 
emerged from conflict-affected settings are excluded12. Since the thesis is 
interested in the nexuses between war and peace, peacemaking and peacebuilding, 
and peace agreement and final constitution, and notably how the contribution of 
constitution making to sustainable peace is affected by taking place amid conflict, 
interim constitutions that were not created in a conflict-affected country and in 
some way related to the conflict are not of interest to this study13. Second, the 
interim constitutions that have not been followed by a final constitution (of which 
some are still in force) have been excluded. Interim constitutions are, as noted 
above, to be seen as part of a broader constitution building process and are almost 
per definition intended to lead to the adoption of a final constitution (Ludsin 2011: 
287; Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 9). As the peacebuilding potential of the broader 
constitution making process can hardly be examined in the absence of a final 
constitution, only cases in which a final constitution has replaced the interim are 
included14. As a result, for Burundi and DRC only the second and last interim 
constitution is considered, while the first is excluded from the analysis. 
3.3 Operationalization of variables 
The units of analysis are countries, more specifically the 11 countries in the 
sample mentioned above. The interim period of each country in the sample is 
broken down into year-units, starting from the year of adoption of the interim 
constitution and ending with the year of adoption of the final constitution. The 
variables examined in the statistical study are operationalized in the following 
ways: 
Level of violence: For each country-year-unit, the number of battle-related 
deaths is recorded. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12 I follow, in line with the International IDEA study, Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) definition of an 
active conflict as one with 25 or more battle-related deaths (BRD) in a calendar year. 
13 Two notes on this: First, Togo was not conflict-affected according to UCDPs Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, 
but there was violence against civilians involved in the democratic transition process, which is recorded in the 
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset (v.1.4-2015). For that reason Togo is included as conflict-affected. Second, 
Thailand was conflict-affected according to UCDPs Battle-Related Deaths Dataset due to a conflict in the 
southern Patani region between Patani independence groups and the Thai government. However, the interim 
constitutions (2006 and 2014) were consequences of military coups and not directly responding to the ongoing 
conflict. Therefore, Thailand is not recorded as conflict-affected in this context. 
14 In the case of Eritrea, the permanent constitution adopted in 1997 has not yet entered into force (Tronvoll & 
Mekonnen 2014: 28). While the implementation of a constitution is, obviously, decisive for its peacebuilding 
effect, its peacebuilding potential lies in its content and the way in which it is made. Eritrea is therefore no less 
relevant and informative to the purposes of this thesis. 
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H2: For each country, the participatoriness of the drafting process, i.e. degree 
of public participation, is examined. Participatoriness is understood and 
operationalized as (1) representation and (2) consultation (equivalent to Widner’s 
(2005) process and consult variables respectively). Representation concerns the 
character of the main deliberative body, i.e. the kind of body with ultimate 
responsibility for preparing the draft (e.g. constituent assembly/legislature, 
national conference, roundtable, elected/appointed). Consultation encompasses 
the level of public consultation in the process, i.e. whether civic education, public 
involvement before and/or after adoption of the draft and a ratification referendum 
was involved. 
H3: For each country, the presence or absence of power-sharing provisions – 
as defined above – in the final constitution is examined. Power-sharing is 
understood and operationalized here as any form of power-sharing, i.e. political 
and/or territorial. Political power-sharing is narrowly understood as guaranteed 
seats or positions in either the legislative or executive branch of government to 
specific political, ethnic or religious groups, i.e. groups directly or indirectly 
related to the previous conflict15. Territorial power-sharing denotes some form of 
regional autonomy or decentralization, including federalism.  
3.4 Case selection for in-depth analysis 
From the 11-case sample, two cases are selected for the comparative case study 
analysis. For the purpose of putting the hypothesized importance of time to “the 
ultimate test”, the cases are selected with respect to variation on the independent 
variable, i.e. the duration of the interim period, so as to ensure the broadest 
possible distribution along the duration span. This rules out the possibility of 
selection bias, as the selection is independent from the results of the quantitative 
study and done without regard to the values of the dependent and intervening 
variables, which are discovered during the study (King et al. 1994: 140). In 
addition to avoiding the arbitrariness of random selection, selecting on the 
independent variable is therefore, according to King, Keohane & Verba, “the best 
‘intentional’ design” (ibid.). 
In the 11-case sample, the duration of the interim period spans from 
approximately one year in Togo (1991-1992) to 9 years in Rwanda (1994-2003) 
(Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 14). Due to a lack of data on Togo’s interim constitution, 
however, the two cases to be examined are Iraq (1,5 year) and Rwanda. In 
consequence of the theoretical deliberations above, we would expect to find a 
higher quality of constitutional deliberation, a more participatory constitution 
drafting process and less likelihood of power-sharing in the final constitution in 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 A broader, consociationalist definition includes e.g. the element of proportional representation (PR) (see e.g. 
Lijphart 2004). As this is not aimed at specific groups and is a common electoral model also in peaceful states, it 
is not used as a measure of political power-sharing here. 
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Rwanda than in Iraq. Overall, Rwanda’s interim constitution is expected, as a 
result of its longer duration, to make a greater contribution to the peacebuilding 
potential of its constitution making exercise than that of Iraq.  
The contextual differences between the two cases are considerable and will be 
discussed in the analysis. An alternative strategy had been to select more similar 
cases, e.g. Burundi and Rwanda: neighboring countries, roughly of the same size 
and sharing ethnic makeup and conflict lines (Hutu/Tutsi). The main priority, 
however, has been to have as much variation on the independent variable as 
possible. 
3.5 Structured, focused comparison 
In the strive for analytic coherence in the case study analysis (as well as between 
the quantitative and qualitative analysis parts), the analysis is guided by the 
method of structured, focused comparison. The approach intends to enhance the 
comparability and, thus, scientific usefulness of case studies by performing them 
in a standardized, comparable manner guided by theoretical objectives rather than 
case peculiarities (George & Bennett 2005). Based on statistical and survey 
research methods, this type of analysis is structured in that it asks the same set of 
general questions to each case, making a systematic comparison of the findings 
possible. In order not to “drown” in the richness and complexity of the cases, the 
study is focused by virtue of dealing only with those aspects of the cases that are 
of theoretical interest (ibid.: 67-70). 
In line with this method, the following questions will be asked to the cases of 
Iraq and Rwanda:  
How was the constitution making period utilized? How did drafting proceed? 
Was the final document consensus-based? What was the nature and extent of 
public participation? Who was included? Was a sense of national identity forged? 
How did violence influence the process? And to what extent was this enabled or 
impeded by the time available?   
3.6 Data collection 
As for the statistical study, sources for the independent variable consist of 
ConstitutionNet’s Interim Constitutions Catalogue and International IDEA’s study 
“Interim Constitutions: Peacekeeping and Democracy-Building Tools” from 2015. 
The level of violence is analyzed using data from the UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths and One-sided Violence datasets. Data on participation comes from 
Widner’s Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution Dataset One on Process and 
Context (2004). The power-sharing variable is based on data on constitutional 
provisions from International IDEA’s ConstitutionNet and Comparative 
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Constitutions Project’s (CCP) Constitute databases as well as an examination of 
the English versions of the sampled countries’ constitutions. 
The material on which the case studies are based consists of both primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources include (1) data on and descriptions of armed 
conflicts from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, and (2) English versions of the 
official interim and permanent constitutions of Iraq and Rwanda. The versions 
used in this thesis are gathered from the ConstitutionNet (interim constitutions) 
and Constitute (permanent constitutions) databases. In the case of Rwanda’s 
Fundamental Law, the original French version is used, taken from Hein Online’s 
World Constitutions Illustrated. Secondary sources include academic articles, 
news articles, press releases, reports by various organizations and books. 
Translated documents always carry an element of subjectivity on the part of 
the translator and a risk of imprecise or inadequate wording in the translation, 
which is all the more decisive in constitutional and other legal documents where 
linguistic precision is vital. Despite these reservations, the sources for 
constitutional documents used in this thesis are believed to be reliable and the 
translations valid. 
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4 Statistical analysis 
This chapter will examine the correlation between the duration of the interim 
period and (1) the participatoriness of the constitution drafting process, as well as 
(2) the presence of power-sharing provisions in the final constitution. First 
however, the relationship between the interim constitution and the level of 
violence throughout the interim period is analyzed. Without aiming to answer it, 
this chapter will inform the question if variance on the duration variable affects 
the peacebuilding potential of post-conflict constitution making.  
4.1 Level of violence 
Figure 2 presents the number of battle-related deaths (BRD) throughout the 
interim period in the 11-country sample16. The red line (x-value = 0) marks the 
year the interim constitution was adopted, while the highest x-value marks the 
year of adoption of the final constitution. The number of deaths in the two years 
preceding the interim period is included to illustrate the intensity of prior conflict 
and the change occurring with the adoption of the interim constitution. 
As the figure shows, in half of the cases (5 out of 11) the interim constitution 
did not manage to end violent conflict, which continued into the interim period on 
a more or less irregular basis. In three of those five cases (Afghanistan, Burundi 
and Iraq) violence was still raging when the final constitution was adopted, thus 
failing to provide a secure context for the drafting to take place in. In all 11 cases, 
however, there was an equal or lower level of violence at the end of the interim 
period than at its beginning: In the four cases where the interim constitution was 
adopted in peaceful circumstances without violence, the interim period remained 
peaceful throughout; where it was adopted in a year with violent conflict, the level 
of conflict was lower in the last interim year, and in some cases violence had 
ceased entirely17. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16 In UCDP’s dataset, the BRDs for Kosovo are listed under the conflict between the Government of Serbia 
(Yugoslavia) and UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army). For Eritrea, the BRDs from 1989-1991 appear in the 
incompatibility between the Government of Ethiopia and EPLF (Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front). 
17 As the interim constitution may have been adopted months into the “adoption year”, some of the violence in 
this year has likely taken place prior to the adoption and can therefore not be considered a “result” of the interim 
constitution. Likewise, BRDs in the last interim year may well have occurred after the final constitution was 
ratified and thus be a “result” of the permanent rather than interim constitution. As the number of deaths within 
the interim period is in both cases expectedly lower than those reported in Figure 2, the above observation likely 
remains valid. 
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Without suggesting causality, the figure shows a positive correlation between the 
presence of an interim constitution and a reduced level of violence during the 
interim period. Whether the impact on the level of violence may be attributed to 
the interim constitution itself or to the peace agreement to which the interim 
constitution is related is obviously difficult to pinpoint – but also less relevant18. 
Interpreting the results, the above figure suggests that while interim 
constitutions are not a guarantor of peace, the expectation that they should halt or 
at least scale down violence is empirically supported. This is a consequence of the 
presence rather than duration of the interim constitution. However, and as the 
figure illustrates, interim constitutions allow the drafting of the final constitution 
to take place in further temporal distance from violent conflict – or in worst case a 
less violent environment – than it otherwise would (3,18 years on average 
between the last year of violent conflict and the final constitution). For that 
reason, the duration of the interim constitution, in combination with its 
peacemaking ability, should positively affect the peacebuilding potential of the 
constitution making exercise (the mechanism by which this happens is illustrated 
in the case studies).  
 
Figure 2: Level of violence during interim period 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
18 In two of the three cases where the final constitution was adopted during ongoing violence (Afghanistan and 
Iraq), there had been no peace agreement at all (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 13). 
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4.2 Participation 
Using data from Widner (2004), this section analyses the elements and extent of 
representation and consultation in the constitution making processes in Chad, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Togo19. The five cases represent altogether full 
variance on the duration variable, ranging from Togo (1 year) in the low end, 
Chad (3), Ethiopia (4) and Eritrea (5) in the medium category and Rwanda (9) in 
the high end20. The cases are therefore suitable for analyzing the correlation 
between duration and participatoriness. 
In four of the five cases, the main deliberative body holding ultimate 
responsibility for preparing the draft was an appointed transitional legislature, 
ranging in the middle of Widner’s (2005) ‘scale of representativeness’. 
Assumingly more representative was the normal legislature that held that 
authority in Eritrea. In none of the cases were there representatives of the parties 
to the armed conflict in this body. 
With the exception of Togo, all cases had a period assigned for public 
education on constitutional matters and the constitution writing process. These 
campaigns usually included meetings with civic groups and local communities as 
well as radio broadcasts. The period in Eritrea was long (16 months), in Rwanda 
(3,5) and Ethiopia (5) of medium length and in Chad short (0,75). In Eritrea, the 
time was used to conduct a substantial campaign with many different elements, 
including explaining the draft and process through school curricula and culture 
(theatre, songs, comics). In all cases but Ethiopia, the campaigns encompassed 
citizens not only in urban but also remote rural areas. 
Public involvement in the drafting processes was widespread. In four cases, 
public input was made to the draft both before and, except for Ethiopia, after the 
release of the draft. Only in Togo no public commenting on the draft took place at 
all. The public was given the final say in a ratification referendum in Chad, 
Rwanda and Togo, whereas in Eritrea and Ethiopia the constitution was ratified 
by the constituent assembly. 
Drawing lessons from the 5-country sample analyzed here, the correlation 
between duration and participatoriness does not appear clearcut. The medium 
duration countries Eritrea and Ethiopia did not have a public referendum, whereas 
the countries at both extremes of the duration scale, Rwanda and Togo, did. 
Moreover, the latter two both had an appointed, medium representative main 
deliberative body despite very different preconditions for electing one. While the 
Eritrean process (high end of the medium duration category) ranked high with 
regard to representation and public education and input, it did not provide for a 
referendum, as did for instance Chad (lower medium end). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 Widner’s data, on which the analysis is based, covers the period 1975-2002 and has not been updated since. 
From the 11-case sample, Widner’s dataset covers only these five countries.  
20 By comparison the average duration of the interim period in the 11-case sample is 4,3 years, the median and 
mode 3 years. 
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In line with the theoretical assumption, however, Rwanda had extensive public 
consultation and education in all parts of the country while there was no input 
from or output to the population in Togo during the constitution making process, 
leaving the Togolese public with a somewhat questionable basis for voting on the 
final constitution. While this may lend some credibility to the hypothesized (H2) 
positive relationship between the length of the interim period and the degree of 
participatoriness in the drafting process, overall the hypothesis is not clearly 
confirmed. 
Finally, the results call into question any putative relationship between an 
educative and consultative process and public support for and, consequently, 
legitimacy of the final constitution. As such, the 1992 Constitution in Togo gained 
support from 98,11% of the voters in the referendum, more than in both Rwanda 
(93,42%) and Chad (61,5%) where public education and input had been extensive. 
4.3 Power-sharing 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the duration of the interim period and 
the presence/absence of power-sharing provisions, as defined in Section 3.3, in the 
final constitution across the 11-case sample. Guided by hypothesis H3, we would 
expect a negative relationship and a concentration of observations in the upper left 
and lower right corners. As the figure shows, this assumption is not supported 
empirically. All three duration “categories” – short (1-2 years), medium (3-5 
years) and long (7-9 years) – contain both power-sharing and non-power-sharing 
cases. The average duration for power-sharing countries (4,7 years) is longer than 
that of non-power-sharing countries (4 years), and overall the relationship 
between duration and power-sharing is slightly positive with a 0,03 slope. In sum, 
not only does the figure not support hypothesis H3, it actually indicates the rather 
opposite effect. 
Following the causal argument, two interpretations, at least, may be given of 
these results: First, a longer interim period may not necessarily entail a stronger 
consensus on national identity. Despite the potential to allow enmities to lessen, 
reconciliation efforts to take place and effect and, ultimately, trust to be built, 
“[a]n interim process does not guarantee that societal groups will be able to locate 
a shared identity or that they will not more strongly identify and coalesce as 
separate groups” (Ludsin 2011: 309). This is a likely explanation for the outlier 
Kosovo where identification as and tension between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians was – and still is – a reality, even after a 7-year long and peaceful 
interim period (Chick 2015). 
Second, the presence or absence of power-sharing does not necessarily reflect 
the existing strength of national identity. On the one hand, a constitution drafted 
on the basis of a weak national identity may not necessarily institutionalize the 
societal division in power-sharing arrangements. It may instead be used by 
drafters as a tool for building that national identity (ibid.: 264) and, as such, a 
result of insistence on a constitution void of power-sharing despite a continued 
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existence of well-defined societal groupings. On the other hand, a constitution 
may contain power-sharing in some form, even in the absence of these groupings, 
if former warring parties agree to (mis)use the constitution to protect their 
interests in “a mere division of spoils between powerful players” (ibid.: 304). As 
Samuels & Wyeth note, “[p]ower-sharing arrangements are often the result of 
agreements between elites over access to power and resources, not real attempts to 
resolve divisions between ethnic communities” (2006: 6). 
Lastly, the results may partly be eschewed by measuring the “wrong” type of 
conflict. While power-sharing is most common in ethnic/identity-based conflicts, 
the conflict in Togo, for instance, was a result of democratic transition processes. 
As such, the type of conflict may well have a decisive impact on the propensity to 
power-sharing, irrespective of the duration of the interim period. 
 
Figure 3: Power-sharing 
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5 Case study analyses 
The following chapter will unpack the questions if and how variance on the 
duration variable affects the peacebuilding potential of post-conflict constitution 
making. Drawing on the results of the statistical analysis above, it will examine 
the hypothesized relationship in the cases of Iraq and Rwanda. For each case, the 
first paragraph will in a descriptive fashion provide the conflict context for 
constitution making, followed by an examination of the interim constitution’s 
impact on deliberation, participation and power-sharing/national identity, before a 
brief summary of findings will round off each case. The chapter will conclude by 
drawing lessons from the two cases for the overall question of the significance of 
time for constitution making’s peacebuilding potential. 
5.1 Iraq 
5.1.1 Background and overview of interim period 
On 20 March 2003 a US-led coalition invaded Iraq in a mission to, in US 
President George W. Bush’s words, “disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, 
to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people” (The 
White House 2003). While the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
in Iraq has since been questioned (Associated Press 2005) and Bush later regretted 
that the intelligence asserting that Iraq possessed WMDs “was wrong” (The 
Washington Times 2006), the objective of the invasion to foster regime change 
and put Iraq on the road to democracy remained and became increasingly central 
(Heuvel 2009: 25). 
On 9 April the ruling Ba’athist regime fell in Baghdad, Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein fled, and shortly thereafter the internationally (mainly US-) orchestrated 
democratic transition process began (Diamond 2005: 9). The first step was, 
paradoxically enough, to install an international administrating body for Iraq, the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by former US diplomat Paul Bremer 
(ibid.: 10). Shortly after its establishment, the CPA appointed a 25-member Iraqi 
Interim Governing Council (IGC) in July, tasked inter alia with delivering a plan 
and timetable for the process of drafting and adopting a new constitution (ibid.: 
11). The CPA, however, retained the supreme decision-making power, including 
the right to veto any IGC decision, and effectively governed Iraq until June 2004 
(ibid.: 10; Heuvel 2009: 25). 
Writing a new permanent constitution for Iraq was regarded in both 
international and certain Iraqi political circles as central, if not crucial, to the 
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transition from an authoritarian past to a stable, democratic future (Brandt et al. 
2011: 338); not only because “none of Iraq’s previous constitutions were 
democratic”, but also because it was expected to institute a level of constitutional 
stability and juridical normality unknown to twentieth-century Iraq, where 
constitutions were mostly of interim nature and frequently breached by coups or 
atrocities committed by autocratic rulers (Morrow 2010: 564, 566). Even the 
otherwise politically stable period under Saddam Hussein had been characterized 
by temporary and often breached constitutions. A new constitution could 
therefore, it was imagined, provide a base on which constitutionalism and the rule 
of law could grow and establish a social contract between the state and citizens of 
Iraq that did not exist beforehand (ibid.). 
The constitutional and political transition processes were initially set out in the 
November 15 Agreement between the CPA and the IGC. The agreement set 30 
June 2004 as the latest date for the transfer of power from the CPA to an 
appointed Iraqi Interim Government – thus formally ending the international 
occupation of Iraq – and prior to that, the IGC were to draft an interim 
constitution that outlined the political process after 30 June 2004 and the steps 
towards a permanent constitution (Heuvel 2009: 25). 
The interim constitution, named the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), 
was promulgated by the CPA in March 2004 and acted as the supreme law of Iraq 
during the so-called “transitional period”, starting from the handover of 
sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government and ending with the formation of an 
elected Iraqi government under a new permanent constitution by 31 December 
2005 at the latest (Coalition Provisional Authority 2004). It stipulated the 
timeframe for and sequencing of events within the 18-month interim period. As 
prescribed by the TAL, elections for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
were held in January 2005. Besides holding legislative authority, the TNA played 
a central role for the continued political and constitutional processes: Politically, it 
appointed in April 2005 a Transitional Government that were to replace the 
Interim Government and govern Iraq until elections for a permanent parliament 
and government were held no later than 15 December 2005; constitutionally, the 
TNA was formally tasked with drafting and adopting the permanent constitution 
with a 15 August 2005 deadline for completing the constitutional draft (Heuvel 
2009: 25-6). In line with the TAL, the new constitution was adopted through a 
public referendum on 15 October 2005. 
Throughout the period sketched out above widespread violence raged in Iraq. 
When the US launched a number of missile attacks in Baghdad on 20 March 
2003, followed by a ground invasion by US and British forces later that day, it 
was the beginning of an interstate conflict between the coalition of USA, Great 
Britain and Australia – backed by a multinational coalition of forces – and the 
government of Iraq that would last less than one month (UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia n.d.a; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia n.d.b). When the last armed 
resistance was eliminated by the Coalition on 14 April, five days after taking 
Baghdad, a total of 7.927 people had died during the course of the conflict (ibid.). 
The ousting of Saddam Hussein from power terminated the interstate war, and in 
the subsequent period of international occupation, coalition forces remained in 
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Iraq during which time they were frequently attacked by opposition groups 
“believed to be a mélange of regime loyalists, disaffected Iraqis, terrorist groups 
and foreign fighters” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia n.d.a). From the time the 
Iraqi Interim Government took over power from the CPA in June 2004, intrastate 
conflict was a reality in Iraq: On one side, the new Iraqi government with strong 
military support from coalition forces who “remained in Iraq to support the new 
government in providing security, policing, and reconstruction” (UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia n.d.c); on the other side, various rebel groups opposing and 
violently resisting the new government and, especially, the presence of foreign 
forces (ibid.). At the same time, sectarian violence mainly between Shias and 
Sunni Arabs spread throughout the country (ICG 2006a). During 2004 and 2005, 
when the TAL interim constitution was in effect, at least 6.702 people were killed 
in the intrastate conflict (4.094 in 2004; 2.608 in 2005) (UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset v.5-2015)21.  
5.1.2 Deliberation 
While the interim period lasted 18 months, the actual drafting process was much 
shorter. Establishing 15 August 2005 as the deadline for submitting the 
constitutional draft, the TAL had provided the TNA – elected on 30 January 2005 
– with little over six months for drafting the permanent constitution. The 275-
member assembly decided at the outset to delegate the writing of the draft to a 
smaller, 55-member committee (Morrow 2010: 572). As a result of prolonged 
negotiations in the TNA over the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, 
the members of the drafting committee, however, were not appointed until 11 
May; the committee’s chairman and vice chairmen not until 23 May; and only in 
June did the committee begin its deliberations, leaving it less than three months 
for the drafting (Brandt et al. 2011: 339; Morrow 2010: 573). 
Once the committee got started, difficulties of reaching consensus between 
Iraq’s three major communities, Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, on central issues such 
as the status and autonomy of the federal regions, the role of religion in the state 
and the management and distribution of oil revenues – along with other factors – 
meant that drafting work progressed slowly (Morrow 2010: 575-6). The TAL had 
allowed for one six-month extension of the deadline, and as 15 August 
approached there was widespread, albeit not unanimous, support for an extension 
in Iraqi political and civil society circles, including among central committee and 
assembly members (ibid.: 573-4). The deadline, however, was not extended, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
21 The numbers reflect deaths resulting from state-based violence. The actual number of casualties related to the 
conflict is slightly higher as some of the non-state violence and one-sided violence committed in the period was 
related to the conflict as well (see UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia n.d.d). 
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seemingly as a result of strong pressure from the US (Horowitz 2008: 1227; ICG 
2005: 3; Jackson 2008: 1273; Ludsin 2011: 269; Morrow 2010: 574)22. 
Several factors suggest that the short drafting period – prompted by the length 
of and insistence on the TAL deadline – did not allow for sufficient deliberation 
and negotiation of the constitution. First, amendments to the constitutional draft 
were made after the deadline had expired. When the 15 August deadline passed, a 
deal had not yet been struck. As a result, a series of ad hoc decisions and actions 
by the TNA followed, including short deadline extensions on an almost day-to-
day basis and amendments to the constitutional draft – actions whose legality has 
been called into question on the grounds that Articles 61(E) and 61(G) of the 
TAL, stating that in the event of a missed 15 August deadline “the National 
Assembly shall be dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly shall be held 
no later than 15 December 2005”, were not observed (Arato 2007: 551; ICG 2005: 
2; Morrow 2010: 582). Even after the constitution was adopted by the TNA on 28 
August, the text was amended several times, the last time on 12 October – only a 
few days before the referendum and after the text had been printed and distributed 
among the Iraqi population for review (Arato 2007: 551; Jackson 2008: 1273-4; 
Morrow 2010: 581-2).  
Second, the final text of Iraq’s constitution reflected to a larger extent 
ambiguity and deferral than consensual solutions. Sunni representatives were 
included in the drafting process only a month before completion and were de facto 
excluded again shortly before the deadline, when negotiations moved to closed 
meetings between Shia and Kurdish party leaders in an effort to speed up the 
process (Easterday 2014: 402). In an apparent attempt to compensate for the 
failure to reach consensus in the constitutional negotiations, the final document 
was left “vague”, “ambiguous” and “capacious” as to comprise different national 
visions and identities, and furthermore deferred the resolution of central issues 
such as the formation of the Federation Council (one of two legislative chambers) 
(Art. 65) and the Supreme Court (Art. 92), a specific definition of federalism, the 
exact division of powers between the central government and regions, and the 
procedures for forming regions (Art. 118) to the national assembly to be elected in 
December 2005 (Hamoudi 2013: 7-8; Heuvel 2009: 27; ICG 2005: 1). 
Furthermore, the provision (Art. 142) that was added to the final constitution only 
days before the public referendum provided for further constitutional amendments 
to be swiftly adopted by the future national assembly and subsequently approved 
by referendum (Jackson 2008: 1273-4). 
Taken together, the above suggests that the very limited time available for 
drafting the constitution did affect deliberation by not allowing for sufficient time 
to build consensus, forge consensual agreements and write a constitution that 
provided clear and negotiated solutions to contested issues, necessitating instead 
broader and less specific “framework” provisions, deferral of important decisions 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
22 According to one source, the drafting committee actually decided to request an extension, but the application 
was retracted after intervention by the US Ambassador to Iraq, who “instructed the assembly that no extension 
was to be granted” (Brandt et al. 2011: 339). 
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and further revision of the document itself. The ambiguous and open-ended nature 
of Iraq’s constitution as well as the necessity of the drafters to make last-minute, 
potentially unlawful amendments to the text right up to the referendum because 
“some provisions were incomplete when the draft was submitted” (Horowitz 
2008: 1227) indicates, that the short drafting period negatively affected the 
amount and quality of deliberation, thus lending support to hypothesis H1. 
5.1.3 Participation 
Judged by the provisions contained in the TAL, the Iraqi constitution drafting 
process was to be a participatory one with high levels of representation and public 
consultation. On the representation side, the main deliberative body ultimately 
responsible for writing the draft was a democratically elected legislature, the TNA 
(Art. 30, 60), representing the highest level of representativeness on Widner’s 
(2005) ‘scale of representativeness’. As for consultation, besides giving the Iraqi 
people the final word in a referendum, the TAL provided for public involvement 
and debate to take place both during and after drafting. According to Article 60, 
the TNA should carry out the drafting “in part by encouraging debate on the 
constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and 
through the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes 
the constitution”. The draft would later be put in front of the Iraqis for ratification 
in a referendum, prior to which “the draft constitution shall be published and 
widely distributed to encourage a public debate about it among the people” (Art. 
61(B)). 
The reality of Iraq’s constitution making process was, however, less 
participatory than what the TAL implied. On 8 August 2005, the final negotiations 
were, as noted above, moved to a small, closed, elite-level forum of Shia and 
Kurdish party leaders, the Leadership Council, convened and closely followed 
(and sometimes hosted) by the US embassy in an attempt to speed up the process 
and make the 15 August deadline (Morrow 2010: 574). From that time, the 
members of the TNA and drafting committee – the latter including representatives 
of the Sunni community as well as women and non-Kurdish minorities – were 
effectively sidelined in the process, without access to constitutional drafts and 
little or no influence on the further development of the draft (ibid.: 582-4)23. 
Finally, the TNA adopted the draft without a vote (ICG 2005: 4), thus largely 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 While it seems plausible that the deadline would not have been met had the committee remained in charge (see 
Morrow 2010: 575-7 for an explanation of the committee’s difficulties in finding common ground), entrusting 
the drafting to a non-representative body in order to meet the deadline was only one of the alternatives available. 
Another was to keep the committee in charge but extend the deadline for six months which, according to 
Morrow, “very likely would have produced better results” based on the assessment that further deliberation 
between and within the three major groups, in particular the Sunni Arab one, as well as better opportunities for 
international mediation could have brought the groups’ negotiating positions closer to one another and increased 
the likelihood of consensus-based solutions (ibid.: 577-80). 
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reducing the constitutional fingerprint of the body formally responsible for its 
drafting to appointing the drafting committee. 
As for public consultation, an outreach unit, charged with disseminating 
constitutional information to the public and receiving and analyzing the public 
response, was set up in early June. The public outreach process, however, was 
flawed. The unit’s first task, to disseminate information, was insufficient at best as 
”there was no period of public education on constitutional issues” (Morrow 2010: 
585). This likely affected the chances of properly understanding and, in effect, 
answering the constitutional questionnaire for non-elite Iraqis in particular24. 
More significant, while the outreach unit ultimately received more than 400.000 
submissions from the public, none of these – nor the report circulated by the 
outreach unit – reached the committee before it was sidelined by the Leadership 
Council on 8 August (ibid.: 586). Thus, effectively, “there was little or no chance 
for the views of the public, as expressed to the committee via the unit, to be taken 
into account in the preparation of the constitution” (ibid.), ultimately failing to 
meet Article 60 of the TAL. 
On a positive note, and contrary to the logic behind hypothesis H2, Iraq’s 
constitution making process did, during and in spite of its short timeframe, see a 
constituent assembly being elected, an expert drafting body established, public 
consultation conducted and a public ratification referendum held (cf. Miller 2010: 
640) – all but the expert drafting body elements of a participatory process. 
Nevertheless, and because of the short timeframe, the merits of these bodies and 
processes for enhanced participatoriness were far from fully enjoyed: In terms of 
representation, the time it took to elect and form the TNA and drafting committee 
– combined with the US insistence on the 15 August deadline – meant that the 
time those bodies had for actual drafting work was very limited. In the end, and 
also a consequence of the insistence on 15 August, the assembly and committee 
were sidelined by the Leadership Council in the decisive final phase, thereby 
reducing their influence on the final draft and, consequently, the degree of 
representativeness of the process overall. 
As for consultation, even though a public consultation program was set up and 
carried out by the outreach unit, the consultation efforts were practically 
undermined by the rushed process towards the TAL deadline and, most notably, 
the transfer of negotiations to the Leadership Council, which left the drafting 
committee with no opportunity to take the public input into account in its drafting 
work. As a result, public consultation in Iraq had no or very little effect on the 
draft constitution. Furthermore, even though the referendum was held and the 
draft constitution was printed and distributed throughout Iraq by the UN prior to 
that – in accordance with Article 61(B) of the TAL – the continued post-adoption 
and even post-printing and -distribution negotiations over and changes made to 
the draft – ultimately a consequence of inadequate time for “official” drafting – 
meant that “the public [was] left in the dark, even up to the point of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
24 Constitutional awareness programs were conducted, however, by various international organizations (ibid.: 
586). 
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referendum, as to the status and contents of the constitution” (Morrow 2010: 582; 
see also Arato 2007: 551; Brandt et al. 2011: 339-40). Consequently, the basis for 
the pre-referendum public debate about the draft constitution, as encouraged in 
Article 61(B), was uncertain at best and illegal and illegitimate at worst. 
In sum, while the institutions and procedures of a participatory constitution 
making process were present in Iraq, the short timeframe made their merits for 
enhanced representativeness and consultation – and whatever degree of legitimacy 
that might follow – much less realized than what they are expected to imply. The 
hypothesized (H2) positive relationship between time and participatoriness thus, 
in the case of Iraq, is presumably confirmed – by the lack of both. 
5.1.4 Power-sharing and national identity 
The constitution of Iraq that was adopted on 15 October 2005 did not include 
political power-sharing arrangements as defined here. Neither in the legislative 
chambers – the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council – nor the 
executive branch – comprising the President and the Council of Ministers – were 
seats or posts guaranteed to or proportionately distributed among distinct 
political/ethnic/religious groups (Constitution of Iraq 2005). Scholars who argue 
that the Iraqi constitution contains political power-sharing elements have looked 
at the proportional representation electoral system (which generated a multiparty 
coalition government at the December 2005 elections) and the representation 
quota for women in the Council of Representatives (see Norris 2008: 29-30, 220-
1). None of these elements, however, were aimed at specific political, ethnic or 
religious groups, and do thus not fall into the ‘political power-sharing’ category 
used in the thesis. 
While the constitution did not establish political power-sharing between Iraq’s 
three large communities – Shias, Sunni Arabs and Kurds – it established a 
vertical/territorial form of power-sharing among different layers of government. 
When the constitution was adopted, Iraq became a federation. The new federal 
system involved a high level of decentralization with four layers of government: 
the federal, regional, governorate and local (Constitution of Iraq 2005: Art. 116). 
The regions – the federal region of Kurdistan in particular – were given high 
levels of autonomy, including the right to adopt their own constitution; the right to 
exercise executive, legislative and juridical powers of their own; their own 
regional security forces; and in cases of a contradiction between federal and 
regional legislation, priority was given to the latter (ibid.: Art. 115, 120, 121.1, 
121.2, 121.5). Governorates were given the right to form a region if accepted by 
referendum (ibid.: Art. 119), leaving the possibility open for a future southern, 
predominantly Shia, federal region (Morrow 2010: 576). The powers of the 
federal government were conversely reduced to foreign policy, defense, and fiscal 
and customs policy, with the rest devolved to regional or local level (Heuvel 
2009: 26), leaving one commentator to conclude that the Iraqi state “is possibly 
the weakest federal government in the world” (Morrow 2010: 564). 
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Considering the influence of the interim period on the vertical power-sharing 
structure contained in the permanent constitution, it is worth noting that much of 
the federal design in Iraq’s constitution was already set out in the TAL25. The 
TAL largely represented the same intent to prevent power centralization in 
Baghdad through a multilevel, decentralized system of government, as did the 
2005 Constitution26. From this it can be inferred, in line with hypothesis H3, that 
the interim period did not reduce the necessity for a federal power-sharing 
solution in the permanent constitution. 
Whether the duration of the interim period had an impact on this seems, at first 
sight, doubtful. The federal solution was seemingly a fairly deliberate choice 
already envisioned when the TAL was made, seen by international actors as a way 
to hold a fragmented Iraq together and preferred by Kurds as a way to secure and 
enhance their own autonomy (Morrow 2010: 567, 580, 588). According to this 
rationing, the constitutional outcome would likely, regardless of the length of the 
process, have been more or less the same. Considering the chronically fragmented 
nature of Iraqi society comprised of various ethnic and religious groups and sub-
groups holding different views of the Iraqi state (Heuvel 2009: 27-8), forging a 
national Iraqi identity in the course of any interim period that would render some 
sort of power decentralization unnecessary would be, to put it mildly, unrealistic. 
As Morrow notes, “[t]he constitution represents probably the only workable 
solution to competing interests of [Sunni] Arab nationalism, Kurdish nationalism, 
and Shia Islamism” (Morrow 2010: 588). 
The rushed constitution making process, however, was able neither to 
transform social and political identities nor to narrow existing societal cleavages 
and thus provide a broader base for national consensus – rather to the contrary 
(ibid.). As shown above, the short interim period did not allow for sufficient 
deliberation between and within Iraq’s major communities to forge a consensus-
based final document. Furthermore, the timeframe was a main factor behind the 
marginalization of Sunnis in the process, the group the least prone to federalism, 
who ultimately rejected with overwhelming majority the constitution in the 
October 2015 referendum (ibid.: 563). As meeting deadlines was prioritized over 
inclusiveness, the constitution making process became a new stake in the political 
battle and societal fragmentation rather than an instrument to solve, or at least 
mitigate, it (ICG 2005: 4). This led the International Crisis Group to conclude that 
“[n]o single issue proved more polarizing in post-war Iraq than the 2005 drafting 
of the country’s permanent constitution” (ICG 2006b: 3). Contrary to initial 
expectations of both the international community and many Iraqis that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
25 Besides introducing (for the first time) the federal system and its division of powers between federal and 
regional governments, governorates, municipalities and local administrations (Art. 4), the TAL contained, inter 
alia, provisions on the exclusive competences of the federal government (Art. 25), the autonomy of the Kurdistan 
region (Art. 53(A) and 54) and the right of governorates to form regions (Art. 53(C)) similar to those in the final 
constitution. 
26 Article 52 of the TAL explicitly states: “The design of the federal system in Iraq shall be established in such a 
way as to prevent the concentration of power in the federal government”. Article 56(C) states a general intent of 
devolution of authority downwards. 
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constitution and the process of making it could constitute a basis for reconciliation 
and unity, it “ended in discord, and sharpened the differences between the Sunnis 
and others” (Brandt et al. 2011: 340). It did not forge a new social contract 
between state and citizens, nor a stronger national identity between the three main 
groups, but instead constitutionalized Iraq’s breakup into geographic regions 
along ethnic and sectarian lines (Morrow 2010: 563-4). 
In line with the logic behind hypothesis H3, a stronger consensus on national 
identity was not established during Iraq’s 18-month interim period – rather to the 
contrary. The final constitution, consequently, institutionalized existing divisions 
in not political but vertical/geographic power-sharing arrangements, affirming the 
hypothesized (H3) negative relationship between time and likeliness of power-
sharing. While some degree of federalism may have been unavoidable, a longer 
interim period could likely have made possible something more than “the weakest 
federal government in the world”. 
5.1.5 Findings 
It is clear that the TAL did not manage to halt violence in Iraq. Whether the 
decrease in violence over the interim period can be attributed to the TAL itself is 
difficult to judge, but doubtful since it neither acted as nor followed from a peace 
agreement or ceasefire. Despite the decrease, the level of violence was still 
substantial when the permanent constitution was drafted, not least in August 2005 
when most of the constitution was written (Morrow 2010: 589). The lack of 
security, together with the short time for drafting, prevented the achievement of a 
participatory and deliberative constitution making process and a consensus-based, 
broadly accepted and fully legitimate outcome. The primary reason for the short 
interim and drafting period was the deadline and sequencing of events set out in 
the TAL. While it cannot be blamed for the insistence on meeting the deadline, 
despite the option it provided to extend it, the TAL did little to enhance the 
peacebuilding potential of constitution making in Iraq. 
5.2 Rwanda 
5.2.1 Background and overview of interim period 
Rwanda’s civil war started in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) swept over the border from Uganda and invaded Rwanda. Since the so-
called “Social Revolution” of 1959-1962, when the Tutsi monarchy was toppled 
and a Hutu-dominated republic established, many Rwandans, mainly Tutsis, had 
fled the country, creating a large Rwandan diaspora in neighboring countries such 
as Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Butenschøn et al. 2015: 61). Established in 1987 by Rwandan refugees in Uganda 
who had participated and gained military experience in the Bush War of 1981-
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1986, the RPF started launching incursions into Rwanda in 1990 looking to secure 
the repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reform, if not topple, the Rwandan 
government (Ankut 2005: 6; Butenschøn et al. 2015: 62). 
Shortly after but not in response to the RPF invasion, a new constitution was 
adopted in 1991 establishing a multi-party system in Rwanda after both 
international and internal opposition pressure. Since 1978 Rwanda had officially 
as well as effectively been a single-party state, the 1978 Constitution banning all 
political formations other than the Hutu Mouvement Révolutionnaire National 
pour le Développement (MRND), but in the wake of the new constitution, a 
process of political liberalization began with new political parties emerging and 
entering the political realm (Ankut 2005: 8). Under their influence in the coalition 
government formed in April 1992, rapprochements between the RPF and the 
government were made and peace negotiations initiated, resulting in the peace 
agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania on 4 August 1993 (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 
64-5). Besides explicitly bringing the intrastate conflict between the government 
and the RPF to an end (Art. 1), the Arusha Accord contained substantial legal 
provisions and, together with the 1991 Constitution, was to act as the 
Fundamental Law of Rwanda during a transitional period set to 22 months (Art. 3; 
Art. 22 of Protocol VI in Art. 2). During that period, a new permanent constitution 
was to be prepared by the newly established Legal and Constitutional 
Commission (Art. 24(B) of Protocol III in Art. 2). Politically, the Arusha Accord 
established a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and a Broad-Based 
Transitional Government (BBGT) to govern the country during the transitional 
period. 
The Arusha Accord, however, did not terminate Rwanda’s civil war27, nor did 
it come to determine the duration of the interim period. On 6 April 1994 the 
airplane carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down by unknown 
perpetrators killing the president as well as his Burundian colleague, both Hutus. 
Hutu extremist groups blamed the RPF for the killing and incited ordinary Hutus 
to retaliate against Tutsis (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 70). Over the course of the next 
three months between 500.000 and 800.000 Rwandans, mainly ordinary Tutsis but 
also moderate and liberal Hutus, were killed28. During the same period, and in 
response, the RPF marched on the capital, which was captured in July, shortly 
after which they took control over the whole country (ibid.). Besides putting an 
end to the genocide and Rwanda’s civil war, the military victory of the RPF also 
marked the beginning of Rwanda’s interim period, on which it came to exert 
significant influence. 
The Fundamental Law governing Rwanda’s 9-year transition period – in 
effect its interim constitution – was constituted by four texts: The 1991 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
27 It can be discussed whether the military actions during the genocide from April to July 1994 should be seen as 
a new intrastate conflict or a resumption of the old one. In line with the literature used for this case study, I 
adhere to the latter view. 
28 Although some literature counts more than one million dead (e.g. Reyntjens 2004: 177-8), the numbers used 
here reflect what the UCDP terms the ”general consensus” in the literature on the genocide (UCDP Conflict 
Encyclopedia n.d.e). 
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Constitution, the Arusha Accord, the RPF Declaration of 17 July 1994 (after 
seizing power) and a Protocol of Agreement signed by the RPF and seven other 
political parties on 24 November 1994 (Reyntjens 1996: 236-7)29. The 
Fundamental Law – which was adopted on 26 May 1995 by the TNA, but entered 
into force retroactively on 17 July 1994, the day when the RPF declared its 
victory – contained no substantial law provisions itself, but hierarchically ordered 
the four constitutional texts as sequenced above (ibid.). As such, without 
completely discarding it, the constitutional order resulting from the negotiated 
settlement in Arusha was restructured “in favor of the victorious party” of the 
civil war, who, due to their military victory, were “able to set the terms and the 
pace of Rwanda’s transitional period” (McDoom 2011: 10; Reyntjens 1996: 236). 
The concrete manifestations of this will appear throughout the following sections. 
The Fundamental Law outlined the timeline and procedures of the transitional 
period. The 22-month long transitional period set forth in the Arusha Accord was 
amended by the RPF Declaration, expanding the period to 5 years (Déclaration du 
FPR 1994: Art. 5). It was later extended to 9 years, ending with the holding of 
general elections in 2003 (McDoom 2011: 10). The Legal and Constitutional 
Commission (Constitutional Commission) was set up at the end of 2000 and given 
three years to finalize its work (Ankut 2005: 15-6). A month later than stipulated 
in the Commission’s Action Plan, Rwanda’s new constitution was adopted by 
referendum on 26 May 2003 and promulgated into law in June 2003 (ibid.: 18). 
Despite the RPF’s military victory in 1994, violence continued on an unsteady 
basis throughout the interim period. After a brief period of inactivity in 1995, the 
new RPF-led government became engaged in armed conflict with the Armée pour 
la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), a rebel group formed by remnants of the 
Rwandan army and the Hutu Interahamve militia who had fled together with more 
than a million Hutu civilians to the DRC (then Zaire) following the RPF’s military 
victory (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 72; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia n.d.f). ALiR 
later became the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). To a 
great extent, however, fighting took place inside or near the border with the DRC 
and became largely inactive by 2002. 
5.2.2 Deliberation 
Out of Rwanda’s 9-year long interim period, 3 years were devoted to the drafting 
process. Looking at the timeline and sequencing of events during that period gives 
a clue as to the nature and extent of deliberation. The TNA elected the members 
of the Constitutional Commission on 10 July 2000, and later, on 23 November, 
appointed its president, vice president and executive secretary (Ankut 2005: 15). 
The Commission used the first six months to properly understand the task they 
had been given and discuss and formulate its internal rules of procedure. It 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
29 Unless otherwise noted, any use of the term ”Fundamental Law” in the remainder of the thesis will refer to the 
one comprised by these four texts. 
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decided inter alia to work by consensus, not taking any decisions unless its 
members were in agreement (ibid.: 16-7). The next four months were spent on 
learning about other countries’ constitution making experiences through study 
trips abroad and an international seminar in Rwanda, during which the 
Commission developed a detailed Action Plan outlining the legal framework, 
strategic objectives, different phases, scheduled activities and detailed timeline of 
the process from May 2002 to July 2003 (ibid.: 17-8; see Legal and Constitutional 
Commission 2002). After extensive public consultation had taken place (see next 
section), the Commission spent two months writing the draft, followed by a three-
day seminar with 800 participants, including the diaspora population and 
international experts, who were to study the constitution and ensure its conformity 
to international standards (ibid.: 18). Finally, the draft was under parliamentary 
debate for 2 months resulting in a number of amendments ahead of the 
referendum (ibid.). 
While only briefly sketched out here (for more details see ICG 2002: 32-3; 
Legal and Constitutional Commission 2002), the way in which Rwanda’s three-
year long constitution making period was utilized suggests a process that allowed 
time for thorough deliberation and negotiation on the constitutional draft. The 
drafters were given time to properly understand and reflect upon the task ahead of 
them and work out their working procedures, ultimately letting them work on a 
consensual basis with discussions continuing until agreement could be reached. 
The timeframe further allowed the knowledge basis upon which the Commission 
prepared the draft to be broadly informed by both large segments of the Rwandan 
population, including the diaspora, as well as international experts and other 
countries’ constitution building experiences. Lastly, upon its initial completion, 
the draft was thoroughly debated on and reviewed by the government, parliament 
and population with amendments made before it was adopted, making the text put 
to referendum in May 2003 a finalized and carefully and thoroughly worked-
through one. 
In line with hypothesis H1, the above suggests that the three-year long drafting 
period in Rwanda positively affected the amount and quality of deliberation by 
allowing sufficient time to work out a consensus-based and thoroughly processed 
final document. 
5.2.3 Participation 
Rwanda’s constitution making process was outlined by the Fundamental Law, 
which, albeit without specifying the exact procedural details, laid the ground for a 
participatory and inclusive process. Considering first representativeness, the 
Rwandan process seems to place itself somewhat in the medium to low end of 
Widner’s (2005: 510) scale. According to the Arusha Accord, while the 
Constitutional Commission was to be comprised of non-elected “national 
experts”, the Commission would be acting under the TNA and submit the 
preliminary draft to the assembly for finalization, the TNA thus holding the 
ultimate responsibility for and authority over the preparation and approval of the 
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draft (Art. 41 of Protocol III in Art. 2). While this could indicate a higher degree 
of representativeness, the 70-member TNA, however, was not a popularly elected 
legislature. Instead, its members were appointed by the political parties whose 
place and share of seats in the assembly was stipulated in the Fundamental Law 
(further examined in the following section) (Art. 60 of ibid.). At the same time, 8 
of the 12 members of the Constitutional Commission elected by the TNA were 
representatives of the parties holding seats in the TNA, leading the International 
Crisis Group to assess that “[t]he composition of Commission members exactly 
mirrors the political make-up of the ANT [French abbreviation of TNA]” (Ankut 
2005: 16; ICG 2002: 6). Due to the influence of the RPF in the TNA, a study by 
International IDEA concludes that the Commission “was not a representative 
body as it only included allies of the RPF” (Samuels 2005: 18). In consequence, 
the Rwandan populace was only indirectly represented in the constitution drafting 
bodies to the extent that the political and constitutional views represented by the 
members of the TNA and Constitutional Commission reflected those of the 
population (2 of the 12 Commission members were representatives of civil society 
(Ankut 2005: 16)). 
Regarding public consultation, the Arusha Accord had instructed the 
Constitutional Commission to conduct “extensive consultation with all the strata 
of the population” in its preparation of the constitutional draft (Art. 41 of Protocol 
III in Art. 2). In addition to their direct involvement in the drafting process, the 
Rwandan public was given control over ratification of the final text in a 
referendum (ibid.). These instructions were closely followed by the Commission. 
Throughout 2002-2003 it conducted widespread and substantial public education 
and consultation campaigns, including (1) a six-month constitutional training and 
awareness-raising program in the provinces in the first half of 2002 involving 
Commission members and thousands of trained assistants, in which discussions 
were held and questionnaires distributed on constitutional issues and responses 
from the population recorded in a database; (2) one month for summarizing the 
public feedback in a booklet to be taken back to the population for validation and 
further education; (3) and one month for public review of the final draft as 
amended by the TNA ahead of the referendum (Ankut 2005: 17-9). A central 
aspect of the process was to sensitize the largely illiterate and rural Rwandan 
population to the nature and role of a constitution and instill a sense of 
constitutionalism. As a tool for this, a training manual was developed targeting 
students, rural and diaspora populations as well as local leaders educating the 
local population (ibid.: 15, 20). 
Although the constitution making period was a relatively peaceful one, 
violence did occur – 155 deaths in 2000, 2.044 in 2001 and 59 in 2002 – in the 
conflict between the Rwandan government and the ALiR/FDLR rebel group 
(UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia n.d.g). Due, however, to the fact that most of the 
fighting took place inside or along the border with the DRC and Burundi and 
before the consultation process was initiated, it did not prevent the population 
from participating in consultation and interacting with the Constitutional 
Commission (ibid.). 
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While the high level of public consultation and inclusivity in the Rwandan 
constitution building process is widely acknowledged, the extent to which the 
participation – and effectively the outcome – was truly democratic and reflective 
of the population’s opinions has been questioned. It has been argued that the 
process was highly supervised by the regime and that most of the participants at 
the meetings and debates held by the Constitutional Commission were “members 
of the RPF and sympathizers of the RPF-led government” (Ankut 2005: 21). This 
may have affected, potentially skewed, the input of the consultation to the 
Commission. Also, due to a lack of oppositional campaigning, there was “no 
challenge to the political strategy enforced by the regime” and the public had “no 
real possibility to reject the [constitutional] text”, making one observer conclude 
that “[i]t was a state-managed referendum, and we have a state-managed result” 
(ICG 2002: 6; Reyntjens 2004: 185). While the overwhelming popular support for 
the constitution in the referendum – 93% voting in favor and an almost 90% 
turnout – may reflect an extensive consultation process producing a document that 
takes into account the prevalent public opinion, it has been argued that it “was a 
consequence of political intimidation, terror and ethnic mobilization” (Ankut 
2005: 20). Despite these claims, a general sense of belonging to and ownership of 
the constitution seems to be prevalent among the Rwandan population as a result 
of their participation in the process (ibid.: 27-8). 
In line with the theoretical assumption in hypothesis H2, Rwanda’s 
constitution making process involved most of the most time-consuming process 
elements, including establishing an expert drafting body, carrying out public 
education and consultation and holding a ratification referendum (cf. Miller 2010: 
640), only the former not being an explicitly “participatory” element. Most 
notably, the three years for drafting the constitution allowed the Constitutional 
Commission the time to conduct a lengthy, widespread and substantial public 
education and consultation process, including time to reach remote parts of the 
country and properly manage and consider the public input. However, in spite of 
the long timeframe the process did not see a constituent assembly being elected, 
but instead relied on an already appointed one for finalizing and approving the 
draft. The reasons for not seeking to increase the representativeness of the 
constitution making bodies, the TNA and Constitutional Commission, however, 
appear more related to political motivation than temporal limitation. Overall, the 
case of Rwanda lends support to the hypothesized positive relationship between 
the time available for and participatoriness of a constitution drafting process – as 
well as the potential merits vis-à-vis the societal acceptance and legitimacy of the 
constitution. 
5.2.4 Power-sharing and national identity 
As it was seen in the statistical analysis, Rwanda’s 2003 constitution did not 
include provisions on power-sharing. Rwanda is a unitary, i.e. non-federal, state 
with a presidential system of government consisting of a two-chamber Parliament 
– the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate – and an executive branch comprising 
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the President and the Cabinet (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 73-8). While the principal 
legislative body, the Chamber of Deputies, in similarity with Iraq, uses the 
proportional representation electoral system and has 27 of its 80 seats reserved for 
representatives of women (24)30, youth (2) and disabled (1), the constitution 
guarantees no posts or seats to political, ethnic or religious groups – most notably, 
the Hutus and Tutsis – in neither the executive nor legislative government 
branches (ibid.). With support thus found for the hypothesized (H3) negative 
relationship between time and power-sharing, this section is dedicated to 
examining the proposed national identity link in the mechanism: Whether a 
stronger consensus on national identity was forged during Rwanda’s 9-year 
interim period, and whether this, at least partly, impacted the absence of power-
sharing arrangements in the final constitution. 
In response to the civil war and in the wake of the multi-party system 
introduced by the 1991 Constitution, the Arusha Accord provided for substantial 
political power-sharing. Whereas the conflict and subsequent genocide was 
largely along Hutu-Tutsi lines, the Arusha Accord shared power not between the 
ethnic groups, but between political parties: The 21 ministerial portfolios in the 
BBTG were allocated to six political parties, including MRND and, for the first 
time, the RPF (Art. 55, 56 of Protocol III in Art. 2); and in the 70-seat TNA all 
registered parties were allocated one seat, while five of the six parties in the 
coalition government were given 11 seats each and the last one 4 (Art. 62 of 
ibid.). While power was not explicitly shared between ethnic groups, against the 
background of a history of monopoly of power by either one ethnic group or the 
other, the distribution of seats to different political parties – in particular the Hutu 
MRND and the Tutsi-dominated RPF – in effect, and for the first time in 
independent Rwanda, constituted power-sharing across ethnic lines (McDoom 
2011: 11-2). The same applied to the posts of president and vice president, which, 
upon the latter’s creation by the RPF Declaration, were held by a Hutu and Tutsi 
respectively (ibid.). More explicitly “ethnicity-focused” was the Arusha Accord’s 
provision for deleting any reference to ethnic group in official documents (Art. 16 
of Protocol VI in Art. 2). 
The attempts at eliminating ethnic identity from Rwandan society intensified 
throughout the interim period. After a civil war and genocide that had deepened 
the already existing cleavage between Rwanda’s Hutu ethnic majority (84%) and 
Tutsi ethnic minority (15%), the new government assuming office shortly after the 
RPF’s military victory in July 1994 adopted a deliberate policy of national unity 
and reconciliation (McDoom 2011: 3, 12). Seeing ethnicity and ethnic 
mobilization as the core drivers behind the genocide, the BBTG intended to 
reduce the role and force of ethnicity in Rwandan society by suppressing ethnic 
identification in public space and promoting instead a single national Rwandan 
identity (ibid.). One concrete example of such policy was the BBTG’s support for 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30 Combined with the requirement for at least 30% of the remaining 53 seats to be held by women, as instigated 
by law in 2007, this has given Rwanda the highest proportion of female MPs in the world (63,8% in the 
Chamber of Deputies since 2013) (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 74). 
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an understanding of Rwanda’s history that assigned primary responsibility for the 
country’s inter-ethnic conflicts to the former colonial ruler, Belgium, rather than 
the ethnic groups themselves (ibid.: 12). The policy was ultimately given 
constitutional weight in 2003, the new constitution banning political parties based 
on ethnic, tribal, racial or other proscribed divisions and obliging parties to 
“constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda” (Constitution of Rwanda 
2003: Art. 54). 
Whereas the power-sharing provisions in the Arusha Accord resembled 
consociationalism, the process of “de-ethnification” and national unification in 
general and informal representation and sharing of power between Hutus and 
Tutsis in government, parliament and presidency in particular had integrative 
overtones. A central driver behind it was the RPF. Coming out of the civil war as 
victors gave the RPF a dominant position in the political sphere in the interim 
period, controlling the posts of president and vice president and dominating the 
BBTG, in which “all power was in the hands of the RPF leadership” (Butenschøn 
et al. 2015: 71, 78). The RPF itself was founded on a pan-ethnic ideology inspired 
by the anti-tribalism of the Ugandan regime, and the political program it adopted 
upon its inception called inter alia for the consolidation of national unity, which 
included the removal of ethnic quotas (ibid.: 62-3). From the outset it attempted to 
attract Hutu members (ibid.), making it both an example of and driver for 
transcending ethnic categories31. With the RPF’s influence over the interim period 
in mind, it may seem less surprising that the permanent constitution put a ban on 
ethnic parties rather than provided for formal sharing of power between them. 
To what extent the deliberate and highly top-down attempts at forging a 
national identity have taken root in the population is uncertain. Studies suggest 
that while the suppression of ethnic identification has to some extent entered the 
private sphere with Rwandans increasingly avoiding the use of the terms Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa (an ethnic minority constituting 1% of the population), the 
categories and antagonisms between them still exist (McDoom 2011: 3-4). 
Because of the difficulty of knowing whether the relative post-genocide inter-
ethnic stability is a result of compliance and fear of repercussions or an actual 
social transformation, “we simply do not know how far Rwanda has moved from 
being a state with a divided society to being a nation united” (ibid.: 4). This 
suggests that the absence of power-sharing arrangements in general and ethnic 
quotas in particular in the 2003 Constitution is a consequence of political 
insistence rather than popular consensus on national unity. The constitution was, 
seemingly, rather to build than built upon a strong consensus on national identity. 
In sum, the case of Rwanda affirms the hypothesized (H3) negative 
relationship between the duration of the interim period and the likeliness of 
power-sharing provisions in the final constitution. Whether the absence of power-
sharing is a consequence of a strong popular consensus on national identity built 
up during the 9-year long interim period is, however, uncertain, although the use 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
31 Although Hutu RPF members have been widely represented in government and held the post of president 
(Pasteur Bizimungu from 1994-2000), the RPF is still predominantly Tutsi (Reyntjens 2004: 187-8). 
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of ethnic markers has become less pronounced among Rwandans and a stronger 
sense of Rwandan identity than immediately after the civil war and genocide is 
likely. Rather, it seems the result of a political insistence on advancing a Rwandan 
national identity at the expense of ethnic ones, reflected by the constitution’s ban 
on ethnic parties. The absence of consociational solutions is, to some extent, 
counterbalanced – and possibly explained – by already existing integrative 
elements of intra-party, -parliamentary and -governmental representation of and 
informal power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis, although the representation is 
not proportionate to their shares of the total population (Reyntjens 2004: 188). 
5.2.5 Findings 
The case of Rwanda is largely supportive of the hypothesized effects of a long 
interim period on deliberation, participation and power-sharing: A positive 
relationship is found in the two first cases; a negative in the latter. The absence of 
power-sharing, however, is an expression of political insistence (and enforcement) 
rather than strong popular consensus on national identity, and as such, the 
duration of the interim period may have been less decisive for the absence of 
power-sharing than it was for deliberation and participation. Nonetheless, the 
Fundamental Law and the timetable it set out overall improved the peacebuilding 
potential of constitution making in Rwanda. 
5.3 Comparing the cases 
Figuring at opposite ends of the duration scale, the cases of Iraq and Rwanda were 
the “ultimate test” of the hypothesized importance of time. In line with the 
hypotheses, the findings suggest that the duration of interim constitutions has a 
positive effect on the amount and quality of deliberation and participation in the 
constitution making process, and, to a lesser extent, a negative effect on the 
likeliness of power-sharing in the final constitution. When considering the 
significance of time for the outcomes in Iraq and Rwanda, however, some 
contextual differences between the two cases must be taken into account. 
One significant difference is the role that continued armed violence played 
during the interim period. In Rwanda, violence was irregular, geographically 
peripheral and had largely ceased by the time the public got involved in the 
drafting process. In Iraq, war was ongoing throughout the interim period, which 
seriously hampered broader participation in the process: A Sunni boycott of the 
elections for the Transitional Assembly; Sunni drafters suspending their 
committee membership after a Sunni member was killed; enhanced security 
measures reducing the opportunity for Iraqis to access and observe the drafters to 
practically nothing; all a result of the unstable security situation (Ludsin 2011: 
255-6; Morrow 2010: 570, 573). This not only undermined the legitimacy of the 
drafting process; its alienation of Sunnis, reflected by their rejection of the final 
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text, is believed to have fueled the insurgency that continued to plague Iraq in the 
following years (Brandt et al. 2011: 340; Ludsin 2011: 269-70). This highlights 
the significance of using interim constitutions to keep violence at bay from the 
drafting of the final constitution, both by virtue of their function as (or connection 
to) a peace agreement and of their duration. Such usage includes the option of 
extending the interim period if the conflict continues unabated or starts anew. As 
the former UN Special Envoy for Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, notes “the long-term 
interests of Iraq would have been served much better if the TAL had been retained 
until peace and security had returned to that unhappy land” (Brahimi 2007: 8). 
Another matter on which the cases differ is the degree of international 
involvement. Rwanda’s constitution was a purely “homemade” one with 
international involvement limited to financial contributions (Ankut 2005: 25). In 
Iraq, not only was the process in general and limited drafting time in particular 
heavily influenced by internationals, mainly the US; the constitution making 
exercise itself was primarily a priority of the US, regarded as a step towards 
democracy and believed to instill an end to violence (Ludsin 2011: 255). The 
reason for writing the constitution was simply not premised on a negotiated 
settlement to civil war by warring parties, as was initially the case in Rwanda. The 
strong international interference that followed greatly impacted the process and 
outcome, not least by deciding the time available. 
Lastly, unlike Iraq, Rwanda is informative as a case of how post-conflict 
constitution making can be affected by taking place after military victory. While 
the RPF largely based the interim constitutional foundation on the Arusha 
Accords that had initially set out the interim process, the changes in the 
Fundamental Law gave them a dominant political position from which they could 
exert influence over the interim and constitution making period. As a 
consequence, in terms of both participation and in particular (the absence of) 
power-sharing the outcomes were to varying extent influenced by the RPF and 
their political preferences, apart from the length of time available (see preceding 
section). These contextual differences, however, do not make the two cases less 
comparable, but rather bring new perspectives and insights on elements that can 
affect the outcome of post-conflict constitution making to the fore. 
Following from the results of the case studies, the implicit assumption is that 
this should enhance the peacebuilding outcome of the constitution making 
exercise in Rwanda and reduce that of the one in Iraq. Without attempting to 
assess the implementation of the constitutions, the following will briefly reflect on 
this assumption in the case studies and, as such, on the distinction between 
‘potential’ and ‘actual’ peacebuilding effect. 
Without embracing the way in which it was made, Hamoudi (2013) – writing 
after years of declining violence in Iraq, but shortly before the conflict with 
Islamic State (IS) escalated – argues that the Iraq Constitution was a success, 
based on the view that “[i]t serves as a ‘constituent agent’ of Iraqi identity, a 
document to which all significant political factions claim fealty and by whose 
ground rules they claim to operate” (ibid.: 1). In his view, the primary reason for 
the success is its ambiguous nature and deferral of contentious matters for later 
resolution. In divided societies such as Iraq’s, he argues, consensus cannot 
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realistically be reached at the bargaining table, and a better solution than forcing 
one group’s vision of the state onto the constitution is to create a capacious 
framework document on which consensual constructions can over time – after its 
ratification and continued efforts at reconciliation – be developed (ibid.: 8-9). 
While it may be that ambiguity and deferral was the best possible 
compensation for the inability to forge a consensus-based document in Iraq, 
Hamoudi’s assertion that “[g]reater time to negotiate [after the constitution had 
been ratified by referendum] (…) proved necessary before something approaching 
a lasting functional order could exist” (ibid.: 9) is not in contradiction to the 
conclusion reached in this thesis. Rather, his assessment supports the assumption 
that more time (for negotiation, reconciliation, trust) is necessary for a durable and 
stable order to emerge. The main (if not sole) difference between conducting post-
ratification negotiations and extending the interim period seems to be whether 
more time would be spent during or after the official constitution making process. 
If spent before, it could likely have rendered the ambiguity and inconclusiveness 
of the final document unnecessary. In effect, Hamoudi indirectly supports the 
conclusion reached here that the time available in Iraq was not conducive to the 
constitution’s contribution to long-term peace efforts. 
In Rwanda, the deliberate attempts at eliminating ethnicity, as enshrined in the 
2003 Constitution, may not have been followed by a similar elimination of the 
potential for conflict. As Butenschøn et al. note: “There is little evidence to 
suggest that the suppression of ethnicity has limited the potential for ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda” (2015: 80). 
In light of the multi- or non-ethnic base of the RPF, the relevance of ethnicity 
for access to power in Rwanda may on the one hand, despite (or even because of) 
the concentration of power in the hands of the RPF, be decreasing and with it a 
central aspect of what previously constituted ethnic discrimination and conflict. 
On the other hand, the RPF party elite is still predominantly Tutsi, and since 1994, 
Tutsis – as well as the RPF – appear to have been overrepresented in Rwanda’s 
political, juridical, academic and military sectors, reflecting, in Reyntjens’ terms, 
a “Tutsization” and “RPF-ization” of Rwandan society (Butenschøn et al. 2015: 
75-6; McDoom 2011: 35-6; Reyntjens 2004: 187-9). According to these authors, 
the official denunciation of ethnicity has been used to mask this fact, leading 
Butenschøn et al. to conclude that “[s]uppressing ethnicity has in effect 
underrepresented the Hutu majority, which may prove to be a risk to peace in the 
future” (2015: 76). McDoom consequently believes that long-term sustainable 
peace in Rwanda depends in part on “the gradual opening of political space and 
de-concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite (…)” (2011: 38). 
Notwithstanding whether any potential future conflict in Rwanda would be 
politically (against RPF dominance) or ethnically (Hutu-Tutsi) motivated, the 
above suggests what may seem self-evident, namely that the absence of power-
sharing in Rwanda’s constitution is not sufficient on its own for preventing future 
conflict, but can contribute - alongside democratization and reconciliation efforts. 
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6 Concluding discussion 
In cases where a new constitution is to be written for a country emerging from 
conflict, the role of interim constitutions in preventing the civil war from 
recurring is a promising but so far understudied matter. While the theoretical 
underpinnings and conceptual framework of interim constitutions is slowly 
emerging, this thesis has aimed to fill an empirical gap by putting a number of 
theoretical assumptions to both statistical and in-depth empirical test. Examining 
the independent effect of the amount of time interim constitutions interpose 
between peace agreement and permanent constitution, the above study shows a 
potential for interim constitutions to positively affect the impact of post-conflict 
constitution making on the prospects of sustainable peace, although the effect is 
not equally strong across all factors under study. 
Concerning the first factor, deliberation, the case studies showed strong 
support for the proposed effect of interim constitutions’ duration on deliberation: 
Longer interim periods positively affect the amount and quality of deliberation. 
Otherwise, as in Iraq, the result may be an ambiguous and non-consensus-based 
constitutional text that fails to garner support from all (major) segments of society 
(the Sunnis in Iraq). 
Unlike the deliberation variable, the two other factors were also examined 
quantitatively. Regarding the effect of time on participation in the constitution 
making process, the statistical results were ambiguous, suggesting some 
(consultation) or little/no (representation) correlation. The case studies, however, 
were more supportive of the hypothesized positive relationship and they indicated 
causality: In Iraq, the merits of otherwise participatory institutions and procedures 
were not fully realized as a result of the short and rushed process; in Rwanda, the 
time available allowed for lengthy and widespread consultation, although it may 
have been affected politically by the RPF-led regime. The in-depth study of Iraq 
furthermore proved the merits of using mixed-methods by revealing a low actual 
effect on participation by elements that in a statistical analysis would have 
indicated the opposite. 
The results on the effect on power-sharing were less promising. The statistical 
analysis showed no clear correlation between the duration of the interim period 
and the presence of power-sharing in the final constitution. Overall, and contrary 
to hypothesized, the relationship found was slightly positive, the exceptions 
including Iraq and Rwanda. The case studies gave some support for national 
identity being an intervening factor between time and power-sharing. However, as 
the study of Rwanda showed, a lack of power-sharing may just as well result from 
a political insistence rather than popular consensus on national identity. 
Obviously, the statistical results must be taken with a grain of salt due to the 
small number (11) of cases examined (5 for participation). Nevertheless, a general 
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conclusion that can be drawn is that while time matters, more time does not do it 
alone. A longer duration does not automatically lead to a more participatory and 
deliberative constitution making process or a stronger consensus on national 
identity, but it enables and raises the probability of it, both by allowing sufficient 
time for the process to be thorough and not inappropriately rushed and by 
increasing the chances of a less violent and polarized and a more – not fully – safe 
and trusting environment for the final constitution to be made in. The statistical 
analysis provided empirical support for this latter point. However, as the case 
studies also showed, the choice and implementation of constitutional and 
procedural design and content will in the end depend much on contextual 
circumstances such as the nature and severity of prior conflict, political 
preferences and international involvement. 
The implications of this study are several. First, it contributes to the dawning 
body of literature on interim constitutions. By doing so, it runs a valuable 
interdisciplinary errand by establishing linkages between the research fields on 
constitution making and peacebuilding/conflict resolution. Besides shedding light 
on their nexus, the thesis speaks to the literatures separately: In the former, 
notably on the role of interim constitutions as part of a broader constitution 
making process; in the latter, on the need and options for integrating short- and 
long-term priorities in peace processes. In addition, the thesis fills a gap in the 
literature on the specific role of time in constitution making in conflict-affected 
settings. 
Second, the thesis contributes with empirical insights into the effects of 
interim constitutions, which has so far been a matter more theorized than 
empirically tested. In doing this, it includes an in-depth coverage of two cases, 
which may appeal to readers interested in the constitution making experiences in 
Iraq and Rwanda specifically. Notwithstanding the results of the study, the 
methodological approach taken can hopefully be of some inspiration to 
researchers aspiring to empirically examine the effects of interim constitutions. 
Finally, the thesis informs the choice and balancing between short- and long-
term approaches to institutional design in transitions from war to peace that faces 
mediators, warring parties, constitution-drafters or policy-makers. With the 
situation in Syria still unsettled and the current high number of both armed 
conflicts and peace agreements in mind, the need for such considerations is both 
substantive and topical. An interim constitution is one possible tool to attain that 
balance, and this study has indicated what that tool may and may not be expected 
to entail. Even in situations where an interim constitution is a consequence of 
certain political circumstances rather than a deliberate policy choice, knowing the 
potential benefits and pitfalls of that situation is one step closer to enhancing the 
impact of the broader constitution making process on the prospects of sustainable 
peace. 
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